segunda-feira, setembro 30, 2013

Quatro milênios de literatura de horror



Direto da edição de hoje do Weekly Standard, reduto neocon, mas também atento à cultura high-profile:

HE MAGAZINE

The Horror, the Horror

Thirty-eight centuries of supernatural lit.

OCT 7, 2013, VOL. 19, NO. 05 • BY MICHAEL DIRDA
In Unutterable Horror, his deeply knowledgeable, lively, and unabashedly opinionated history of supernatural fiction, S. T. Joshi suggests that a taste for ghost stories and weird tales is far more than a slavering hunger for blood and grue. The most important supernatural fiction doesn’t merely aim to make our flesh creep. Through it, ambitious writers—and their readers—are able to explore the full range of human experience. Like many classical tragedies, these unsettling stories typically introduce a sense of wrongness, followed by growing dread, and gradually build to a moment of supreme crisis and terror. And yet their final effect is often a cathartic sense of pity. There, but for the grace of God, go you or I.
Vincent Price strangling Basil Rathbone in ‘Tales of Terror’ (1962)
VINCENT PRICE STRANGLING BASIL RATHBONE IN ‘TALES OF TERROR’ (1962)
EVERETT COLLECTION
Nothing human is alien to supernatural fiction. Transgressive by definition, it ventures into the dark corners within all of us, probing our sexuality, religious beliefs, and family relationships, uncovering shameful yearnings and anxieties, questioning the meaning of life and death, even speculating about the nature of the cosmos. It’s no surprise that almost every canonical writer one can think of has occasionally, or more than occasionally, dabbled in ghostly fiction: Charles Dickens, Henry James, Somerset Maugham, Elizabeth Bowen, John Cheever, even Russell Kirk, to name just a few outstanding examples. The genre’s best stories are, after all, more than divertissements. They are works of art that make us think about who and what we are. 
And, yes, they are also scary. Sometimes really scary. 
In some ways, the first chapters of Unutterable Horror are largely backstory. Joshi mentions ghost stories from antiquity (in Petronius and Pliny), dramatic works like Euripides’ Medea, and such Elizabethan classics as Macbeth and Dr. Faustus. But he begins in earnest with the late 18th century, arguing that only when people had ceased to believe in witches and ghosts and the devil could they begin to play with them as elements of fiction. Still, like most modern readers, Joshi doesn’t think much of the period’s Gothic novels, which run to rationalized endings, verbosity, and an overuse of the same dramatis personae—evil monks, Byronic aristocrats with dark secrets, terrified virgins. Only M. G. Lewis’s exuberantly sexy and flamboyant The Monk (1796), Mary Shelley’s endlessly interpretable Frankenstein (1818), and the long, multi-layered Melmoth the Wanderer (1820) by Charles Robert Maturin earn the Joshi stamp of approval. 
In the 19th century, Joshi rightly praises James Hogg’s Private Memoirs and Confessions of a Justified Sinner (1824), a book somewhat reminiscent of, and indeed better than, Robert Louis Stevenson’s more famous Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde (1886). It is, in truth, one of the most disturbing novels ever written and should be far better known. Joshi dutifully points to the European influence of E. T. A. Hoffmann—best known for “The Sandman,” the story upon which Freud built his theory of the uncanny—but judges much of Hoffmann’s work incoherent and lacking “aesthetic rigor.” Instead, our own Edgar Allan Poe takes pride of place, partly for the variety of his revolutionary storytelling and partly for the inspired artistry he brought to it.  
Up to this point, one can make no serious objections to Joshi’s history (though, in my view, he undervalues E. T. A. Hoffmann). However, hackles will rise when Joshi dismisses Sheridan Le Fanu’s fiction (except for “Green Tea”) as inartistic, ineffectual, and long-winded; discovers little merit in the many women writers of Victorian ghost stories; offers faint praise for such moving tales as Arthur Conan Doyle’s “The Captain of the ‘Pole-Star’ ”; fails even to mention Vernon Lee’s “Amour Dure” (my own favorite ghost story); and condescends to Dracula (1897) as a second-rate farrago.
Often, Joshi’s negative critiques focus on prolixity, an inattention to (a favorite term) collocation—by this he means the pleasing flow of sentences—and the generally shambolic character of so much 19th-century fiction. But as anyone who has ever looked at a Biedermeier interior or skimmed the menu of a royal banquet knows, the Victorians reveled in excess. A little too much was just enough for them. One needs to adapt to a slower narrative rhythm to appreciate Dickens, Wilkie Collins, or even Edward Bulwer-Lytton, whose Zanoni (1842) and A Strange Story (1862)—both well analyzed here—are foundational works of occult fiction.
Obviously, one must grant a critic his aesthetic criteria and allow Joshi to be true to his. Yet should this admirer of (and recognized authority on) Ambrose Bierce and H. L. Mencken be quite so derisive when books and authors fall short of his high standards? The correction of taste shouldn’t preclude charity, or a recognition that commercial entertainments and jeux d’esprit have their place in our lives. Moreover, the most high-minded critical principles can sometimes be too confining—think of F. R. Leavis’s overstrict determination of “the great tradition” in English fiction—such that they seem to shortchange the full range of literary art. If Dracula is such a mishmash, which it certainly is, why do people continue to read it with such fascination and pleasure?
As an outspoken atheist, Joshi also tends to undervalue work by professing Christians. In his view, the best supernatural fiction tends to be written by bold materialists; authors who actually believe in a spiritual realm can only produce bland, anodyne spooks and a “benign supernaturalism.” He even calls Dickens’s A Christmas Carol (1843a “wretched piece of sentimentalism.” Moreover, Joshi prefers fiction that works out logically, that carries an explicit meaning. Unresolvable ambiguity is an annoyance. Thus he argues, quite cogently, that the ghosts are real in The Turn of the Screw (1898). 
The first volume of Unutterable Horror draws to a close with high praise for a group of Americans: Edith Wharton, Sarah Orne Jewett, and Mary E. Wilkins Freeman for their well-made ghost stories; Robert W. Chambers, mainly for his disturbing collection The King in Yellow (1895); and F. Marion Crawford, best known for his nautical classic “The Upper Berth.” 
As may be clear by now, Joshi really shines when he writes about those authors he truly cares about. In the second volume, then, he comes triumphantly into his own, especially in the sections dealing with M. R. James, Arthur Machen, Lord Dunsany, and Algernon Blackwood. If you like supernatural fiction at all, these are likely to be, as they are for Joshi, the titans. James is the master of the antiquarian ghost story (and Le Fanu’s early champion), Arthur Machen and Lord Dunsany wrote exceptionally beautiful prose, and the pantheist Blackwood produced what are, for many, two of the best eerie tales of all time: “The Willows” and “The Wendigo.” 
In general, Joshi is surprisingly sympathetic to the restrained English tradition of ghostly fiction, represented by Walter de la Mare and L. P. Hartley, in particular. He rightly applauds the former’s complex meditation on personal identity, The Return (1910), and the latter’s macabre humor, as in the punning title of the famous story, “A Visitor from Down Under.”
As the world’s leading authority on H. P. Lovecraft, Joshi naturally writes enthusiastically and convincingly about that Poe of the 20th century. He argues that, as with Poe, there may be an occasional floridity in Lovecraft’s stories—a stylistic trait much exaggerated by his critics—but on the whole, they are tightly constructed to achieve maximum emotional effect. To Joshi, Lovecraft is particularly important for his cosmic vision, most strongly delineated in At the Mountains of Madnessand The Shadow Out of Time (both 1936). While he didn’t actually believe in his Old Ones or Cthulhu, Lovecraft employs them as heuristic devices to drive home the fundamental unimportance of self-important humankind. 
In general, Lovecraft’s two best-known contemporaries and fellow contributors to Weird Tales, Clark Ashton Smith and Robert E. Howard, are treated as less than full-fledged writers of horror fiction. The first is primarily a poetic fantasist, the latter the author of fast-paced adventure stories (his best known creation being, of course, Conan of Cimmeria). To Joshi, Smith stands, first of all, as the world’s finest writer of weird poetry. It almost goes without saying that he has edited Smith’s complete poems, just as he has recently edited those of Smith’s mentor, George Sterling, in three volumes. But then Joshi—who has some 200 books to his credit—is arguably even more important as an editor, textual scholar, and bibliographer than as a critic. 
As he continues his march through the last century’s horror fiction, Joshi does increasingly revert to summary judgment, to the presentation of one plot précis after another, and to occasional snide remarks (Daphne du Maurier’s work “is not entirely to be despised”). Lovecraft’s acolytes—August Derleth, Donald Wandrei, and Robert Bloch, among others—are viewed as largely derivative of the Master, while the many writers of pulp horror (such as the prolific Seabury Quinn and England’s Dennis Wheatley, author of The Devil Rides Out, 1934) are waved away as unworthy of attention. 
In contrast, Joshi lauds the fecundity of the young Ray Bradbury’s imagination, especially in his early stories collected in The October Country (1955), while also noting that his “understanding of the psychology of adolescent boyhood is perhaps unmatched in literature,” as is his “ability to evoke the aching nostalgia of long-lost childhood.” Both of these qualities are brought to the fore in SomethingWicked This Way Comes (1962), “a novel of genuine terror.” 
Joshi also admits the effectiveness, however slick at times, of shockers and contes cruels by the multi-talented Gerald Kersh (no one ever forgets “Men Without Bones”), Roald Dahl, and the various writers for Rod Serling’s The Twilight Zone, chiefly Richard Matheson (author of the last-man-on-earth classic I Am Legend, 1954). In the pages devoted to Shirley Jackson, Joshi displays both his forthrightness and critical acumen in finding The Haunting of Hill House (1959) “a bit diffused and unfocused,” preferring Ramsey Campbell’s 1996 The House on Nazareth Hill as the best of all haunted-house novels. Nonetheless, he aptly sums up Jackson’s virtues:
Her work as a whole is pervaded with an abiding sense of the weirdness that can emerge from the commonest elements of ordinary life. Her penetrating understanding of human character, and especially of human loneliness even in the midst of crowds, and the rapierlike satire that she frequently directed at the bountiful instances of greed, stupidity, smallmindedness, hypocrisy and other lamentably common human foibles render much of her work chillingly terrifying even when nothing overtly bizarre occurs.
As readers will recall, a horror boom swept the 1970s and ’80s, initiated by Ira Levin’s Rosemary’s Baby(1967), William Peter Blatty’s The Exorcist (1971), and Thomas Tryon’s Harvest Home (1973). (The first two Joshi picks at; the third he pronounces—to borrow his own favorite adjective—an imperishable masterpiece.) Toward Stephen King and his voluminous body of work Joshi is largely unsympathetic: “I do not wish to suggest that King is a total failure on purely aesthetic grounds. He has had some modest successes.” Joshi then names The Running Man (1982) the writer’s best book. Clive Barker he finds undisciplined and overly prolific, except in The Damnation Game (1985), which “stands as one of the finest horror novels of the past 50 years.”
The horror boom faded partly because film usurped print as the preferred medium for Grand Guignol excess. Today, maintains Joshi, Ramsey Campbell is, by a long measure, the greatest living writer of supernatural fiction. I suspect most people, except Stephen King fans, would agree with this judgment. But up until his death in 1981, Robert Aickman claimed that honor. His beautifully composed “strange stories”—“Ringing the Changes,” “Bind Your Hair,” “Into the Wood,” and many others—elude clear-cut interpretation, yet remain profoundly disquieting. 
Two of the finest recent writers of supernatural fiction have regrettably fallen silent: the reclusive Thomas Ligotti and T. E. D. Klein, the former editor of Twilight Zone magazine. But I envy anyone who has yet to discover the elegant work of Reggie Oliver, Caitlin R. Kiernan, Mark Valentine, Laird Barron, Barbara Roden, R. B. Russell, Simon Strantzas, Richard Gavin, Ian Rogers, Jeffrey Ford, Simon Kurt Unsworth, and Glen Hirshberg, among many others. You may have to search for their books, though, most of them having been published by specialty presses such as Tartarus, Ash-Tree, Centipede, Night Shade, PS, Tachyon, Prime, Hippocampus, Swan River, Chizine, and Subterranean.  
All these authors and publishers are well worth your attention.
If you are attracted to supernatural fiction, and ours is an era when the fantastic flourishes in art, literature, and film, then you will want to read Unutterable Horror (although you will need to pardon the unconscionable number of typos in these otherwise handsome volumes). A good general rule, however, is this: Trust Joshi on the books he praises, but look for yourself at those he dismisses or disdains. 
That said, if you can’t quite face an 800-page, two-volume work, you should go back to Lovecraft’s groundbreaking monograph Supernatural Horror in Literature (1927). There are many editions, but the one to get is annotated by Joshi. Of course, if you’ve never read any horror fiction at all, the place to start is still the classic 1944 anthology Great Tales of Terror and the Supernatural, compiled by Herbert A. Wise and Phyllis Fraser (later, Cerf Wagner). This should be followed by David G. Hartwell’s The Dark Descent: The Evolution of Horror (1987) and The Weird, Ann and Jeff VanderMeer’s wide-ranging 2012 compendium of “strange and dark stories.”
Keep a light on.
Michael Dirda is the author, most recently, of Classics for Pleasure and the 2012 Edgar Award-winningOn Conan Doyle.

segunda-feira, setembro 09, 2013

Gandhi em mangá

Por que ninguém pensou nisso antes? Depois do excelente March, sobre o movimento dos direitos civis nos EUA, eis que descubro uma biografia de Gandhi em quadrinhos japoneses. Não é um excelente meio para introduzir as pessoas à vida de grandes figuras históricas?



http://www.amazon.com/Gandhi-Manga-Biography-Kazuki-Ebine/dp/0143120247/ref=tmm_pap_title_0?ie=UTF8&qid=1378772215&sr=1-1

Andrew Bacevich sobre o problema na Síria (legendas em inglês inclusas)

Andrew Bacevich on Taking Action in Syria | Moyers & Company | BillMoyers.com

Aqui vai a transcrição:

Bill Moyers
September 6, 2013
Andrew Bacevich on Taking Action in Syria
PHIL DONAHUE: Welcome. I’m Phil Donahue.
Bill Moyers is away this week and I am pleased to be sitting in for him. Our subject is Syria.
What began there two and a half years ago as part of the Arab Spring has turned into an all-out civil war. Now has come the shocking evidence of poison gas attacks. A fatal escalation that has led President Obama to ask Congress to authorize the limited use of military force. And if we take action, where and when does it stop?
Historian and analyst Andrew Bacevich is here asking those questions. A graduate of West Point and Vietnam veteran, he served in the military for 23 years before becoming a professor at Boston University. His books include The Limits of Power and Washington Rules. His latest, Breach of Trust.
Andrew Bacevich, welcome…
ANDREW BACEVICH: Thank you very much.
PHIL DONAHUE: Well, I'm pleased to have this chance to chat with you for a lot of reasons. One, I don’t know who else has more cred than you.
What would a 23-year graduate of West Point offer us now regarding the dilemma in which Obama finds himself, regarding Syria?
ANDREW BACEVICH: Well, I mean, if I could have five minutes of the president's time, I'd say, "Mr. President, the issue really is not Syria. I mean, you're being told that it's Syria. You're being told you have to do something about Syria, that you have to make a decision about Syria. That somehow your credibility is on the line."
But I'd say, "Mr. President, that's not true. The issue really here is whether or not an effort over the course of several decades, dating back to the promulgation of the Carter Doctrine in 1980, an effort that extends over several decades to employ American power, military power, overt, covert military power exercise through proxies, an effort to use military power to somehow stabilize or fix or liberate or transform the greater Middle East hasn't worked.
“And if you think back to 1980, and just sort of tick off the number of military enterprises that we have been engaged in that part of the world, large and small, you know, Beirut, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, and on and on, and ask yourself, 'What have we got done? What have we achieved? Is the region becoming more stable? Is it becoming more Democratic? Are we enhancing America's standing in the eyes of the people of the Islamic world?'
"The answers are, 'No, no, and no.' So why, Mr. President, do you think that initiating yet another war, 'cause if we bomb Syria, it's a war, why do you think that initiating yet another war in this protracted enterprise is going to produce a different outcome? Wouldn't it be perhaps wise to ask ourselves if this militarized approach to the region maybe is a fool’s errand.
"Maybe it's fundamentally misguided. Maybe the questions are not tactical and operational, but strategic and political." You know, I have to say, I'm just struck by the fact that Secretary of State Kerry has become the leading proponent for war. It's our secretary of state's job apparently--
PHIL DONAHUE: He threw his medal-- he threw his medals back.
ANDREW BACEVICH: Well, that's why it's doubly ironic. 'Cause the Secretary of State is the war promoter. And that our secretary of state happens to be a guy who came into politics basically advertising himself as the guy who because of his--
PHIL DONAHUE: Understands war?
ANDREW BACEVICH: --Vietnam experiences, understands war, understands the lessons of Vietnam, and is therefore going to prevent us from doing dumb things. On the contrary, he's the lead cheerleader to go through another dumb thing.
PHIL DONAHUE: President Obama would say to you, "These are children being grossly and painfully killed."
ANDREW BACEVICH: Yeah.
PHIL DONAHUE: "How can you watch these videos with the foam coming out of the nostrils. And we've got to do something."
ANDREW BACEVICH: Well, the attack is a heinous act. Now does the fact that they were killed with chemicals make it more heinous than if they were killed with conventional ammunitions? I'm not persuaded.
I mean, I think the issue, one of the issues here, to the extent that moral considerations drive US policy, and I would say as a practical matter they don't, but let's pretend that they do to the extent that moral considerations drive US policy, there's a couple of questions to ask. One would be, "Why here and not someplace else?"
I mean, just weeks earlier, the Egyptian Army killed many hundreds of innocent Egyptians. And we sort of shook our finger at Egypt a little bit, but didn't do anything. So why act in Syria? Why not act in Egypt? I think that that needs to be sort of, that needs to be clarified.
And the other question will be, "Well, if our concerns are humanitarian, why is waging war the best means to advance a humanitarian agenda?" If indeed US policy is informed by concern for the people of Syria, let's just pretend that's the case even though I don't think it is. If it's informed by concern for the people of Syria, why is peppering Damascus with cruise missiles the best way to demonstrate that concern?
I mean, a little bit of creative statesmanship it seems to me might say that there are other things we could do that would actually benefit the people of Syria, who are suffering greatly, who are fleeing their country in the hundreds of thousands. Who are living in wretched refugee camps. Why don't we do something about that? Why wouldn't that be a better thing to do from a moral perspective than bombing Damascus?
PHIL DONAHUE: How do we explain media's submission to these warlike -- let me just give you one -- Nicholas Kristof, of the Times: "Since President Obama established a 'red line' about chemical weapons use, his credibility has been at stake: he can't just whimper and back down." Whimper. I mean, who wants a whimperer for president? And there's an awful lot of macho in this. And by the way, why can't the president just say, "Hey, I really shouldn't have said 'red line.' That was a mistake, it was a moment, I'm a human, sue me, I'm rectifying that now and I'm going to take a more--"
ANDREW BACEVICH: Well, I think, one point there is that in many respects, this crisis is being driven by domestic politics. I think the president did make a mistake in drawing that red line. I suspect the president actually understands he made a mistake.
And then when Assad called its bluff, as it were, the president finds him in a … the president finds himself in the position where yes, he's got to do something to restore his credibility. Well, when you think about it's not going to restore any credibility. I mean, when you think about it, is credibility worth going to war for?
When you think about it, if indeed American credibility in that part of the world is kind of low right now, is it because the president drew a red line and didn't act? Or could it be because of the folly of American wars in places like Iraq? I mean, will bombing Syria make the memory of Iraq go away?
Well, the memory of Iraq has already gone away in the eye-- in-- for most Americans. But is it going to cause people in the Arab world or the broader Islamic world to forget Iraq and all the chaos that we created? I mean, I'm struck by the fact that we're having this sort of national hoop-dee-doo about Syria on the front page of the paper. If you turn back to page five or page seven, you'll get the latest dispatch out of Baghdad. "Bombs going off in Baghdad, killing 65." Is there any relevance to that continuing story coming out of Iraq to the prospect of Syria? Seems to me there ought to be. I mean, the last time we persuaded ourselves that we needed to act in Iraq, we produced a disaster.
Now some number of Americans paid for that disaster in terms of soldiers killed, lives shattered. Far, far greater numbers of Iraqis paid for that disaster and are still paying for that disaster. So the conversation about Syria is far too narrow. It needs to be expanded to include some of these other military misadventures that we have undertaken.
And I think it needs to be expanded to include fraudulent relationship between the American military and American society. Which allows our political leaders to go off on these wild goose chases while the American people basically stand by mute.
PHIL DONAHUE: One of the conservative talking heads in the shout shows on cable said that going to, "If Obama goes to Congress, he will show weakness. I mean, it's only in the Constitution. He will show weakness if he obeys the Constitution. Everything is turned upside-down here now.
ANDREW BACEVICH: Well, I think if there's one iota of good news here, I think it is that he's gone to the Congress. Now the president didn't go to the Congress because he realized that he's a constitutional lawyer and suddenly was becoming a strict constructionist.
He went to the Congress because he was sitting out there on this limb all by himself, even without the Brits, and decided that it was a lonely place to be, that he wanted to see if he could induce the Congress to come out and join him. But that said, whether he intends it or not, he is setting a precedent, a precedent that says that maybe when we do attack some country, the Congress ought to be consulted.
And what, and the significant of that I think is three, four, five years from now, when Obama's successor has some great idea that he wants to go bomb somebody or invade somebody, I hope there will be some questions asked that will say, "Hey, wait a second, Mr. President. Back in 2013, before Obama acted, he thought he needed to ask the Congress. Why doesn't that apply to you?" So I think that's the one little bit of good news out of this—
PHIL DONAHUE: Yeah, except Obama made the point emphatically that I don't need your approval. I can go alone anyway--
ANDREW BACEVICH: He did. He did.
PHIL DONAHUE: We are the only country with the capacity to do what we're about to do in Syria. Do you believe that?
ANDREW BACEVICH: There's no question that in terms of the capability to project power, to put ordinance on targets, to mask military power in every dimension, at land, sea, air, cyberspace, our capabilities are beyond anybody's capability to match. Unfortunately, that doesn't necessarily yield wise policy. It doesn't even yield military victory.
Again, when you think back on the actual history, the military history of the United States in the Middle East over the past several decades, victory has been exceedingly hard to come by. We're always stronger by many measures than the adversary. But somehow or other, being strong doesn't translate into political objectives being achieved quickly or economically.
What actually happens is that the projection of American power leads to unexpected complications. And gets us more deeply imbedded in a set of circumstances that we can't handle. There are enormously deep and powerful forces of change that are, have come to the surface and are transforming that part of the world.
We have claimed, presidents have claimed, George Herbert Walker Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and now this president, have claimed that we possess the capacity to somehow direct or control these processes of change. Even though the truth is, we don't have that capacity. The truth is, we are largely irrelevant to what's going on in that part of the world. But if we reach out and, you know, use our military powers to drop some missiles here and there, we can sustain the illusion that we have some kind of relevance. But we don't. PHIL DONAHUE: In your book, your commentary about a loss of the citizen's army is especially germane to what's happening now with Syria. It's easier now to go to war is one of the points you make. And as now we think about Syria, how do those two come together?
ANDREW BACEVICH: Well, I’d back up from Syria a little bit. And I think I'd want to tell a story that begins really back at the end of the Vietnam War. A war that divided the country, a war that in many respects shattered the United States military. And part of the response to that war was that the American people decided to jettison the longstanding tradition of the citizen soldier.
Richard Nixon endorsed that when he ended the draft and declared the creation of an all-volunteer force. And for some considerable period of time, this seemed like a smart move, a good thing for the country. It let citizens off the hook, also gave us highly capable and well-trained and well-disciplined soldiers. What only became evident after the Cold War ended, however was that this new professional army really was no longer America's army. It was Washington's army. And Washington began to--
PHIL DONAHUE: As in Washington DC?
ANDREW BACEVICH: As in Washington DC. And Washington began to do with that army whatever they wanted, regardless of whether the people had signed up to the enterprise. And this greater pension for war I think really reached its zenith after 9/11 with President George W. Bush's decision to invade Iraq, as so many people have said, a country totally uninvolved in 9/11.
And this was the ultimately testing time for this great, professional army of ours. And I'm sorry to say it failed the test. We were supposed to win quickly, economically, easily. We didn't win. And instead, we ended up with a protracted war. Part of a series of post 9/11 wars where -- bringing us to where we are today where Syria may well be yet another one of these wars waged by Washington with its army while the people are left sitting on the sidelines.
PHIL DONAHUE: And making no real sacrifice – was it one percent of our citizens?
ANDREW BACEVICH: Yeah, it's interesting. You know, sort of the inverse of the complaint of the Occupy Movement. You know, the Occupy Movement said there's the one percent of the rich people who are screwing the 99 percent. And when it comes to basic military policy, we have the 99 percent screwing the one percent. It's the one percent who gets sent off to fight these endless wars.
PHIL DONAHUE: So it's going to be easier then to have another one and another one. We haven't even, it seems to me, we haven't even looked at ourselves regarding the wars that we've had.
ANDREW BACEVICH: That's--
PHIL DONAHUE: Nobody--
ANDREW BACEVICH: That's one of the most troubling aspects of this whole thing. It staggers me that the American people have so quickly put the Iraq War in the rearview mirror. Indeed, won't even look in the rearview mirror.
Because if they did, they could see in the rearview mirror the smoking ruin that we left behind. Instead, there is this preoccupation to deal with the next crisis, which as we speak, is Syria. Six months from now, it'll probably be something else.
PHIL DONAHUE: I imagine that so few people sacrifice, for example, in the Iraq War. In your book, in one line, you take the breath away by revealing that you lost your son. And I know you certainly have no responsibility to get into this, and I do not mean to labor it. But is it possible for you to share your own, with us, your own thoughts?
ANDREW BACEVICH: It’s probably not. I have tried to make it a rule that that's a private matter and I try to keep it private. But I was watching your film, your wonderful documentary. One of the things that makes it so powerful is the way the young soldier and his family opened them up, opened themselves up to you. That's what made the film. On the other hand, because of my personal experience as I watched that, I said to myself, "I could never bear to do that." Just couldn't bear to do it. It’s got to stay private.
PHIL DONAHUE: If I lost somebody in a war, I guess -- I felt it was the most sanitized war of my lifetime. I think if you're going to send your young men and women, as we say quaintly, "in harm's way," show the pain. Don't sanitize the war.
ANDREW BACEVICH: I agree. And you know, in one, in the sense, one way we may sanitize the war by putting restrictions on you know, what can be filmed and all that. Be we also sanitize the war in the way the waging of war is consigned to certain sectors of society. If Harvard, Princeton, and Yale--
PHIL DONAHUE: Sent their guys to war.
ANDREW BACEVICH: ---were there, this inclination to turn away from the ugliness would be unsustainable. That's why, you know, one of the things I tried to emphasize in the book is to contrast the post-9/11 wars with World War II. The so-called "good war." The last war that we actually won, outright. A war that was fought by citizen soldiers.
Not by accident, a war in which our leaders, from President Roosevelt on down said that this will be a people's war, there will be sacrifice across the board, it will be fought with the people's army, even citizens who are not in the army will participate in their own way, their taxes will go up, not down, like after 9/11.
Their pension for consumption will be curbed for the duration, not indulged, as was the case after 9/11. So part of the argument is that a war waged by citizen soldiers that engages the energies and the attention of the American people is, in fact, more likely to result in success, victory, political objections achieved, than has been our experience with a professional army, which in many respects is qualitatively superior. But it doesn't win.
PHIL DONAHUE: In my own encounters with dissenters, and they're out there, they're out there in great numbers, and we all wonder why there aren't more -- I've seen a lot of empty seats. And I've seen a lot of blowback, a lot of criticism, you know the story, unpatriotic, you don't understand, geopolitical. I'm curious to know how you've dealt with this and how much personally.
I'm thinking of you as that young, good-looking cadet, and when you entered West Point, how proud your parents must have been, how proud you were, and I'm sure proud today what over the years-- how did your brain evolve here? Where you've become one of the leading voices in dissent and honest analysis of America's foreign policy.
ANDREW BACEVICH: I mean, life's a journey. You know, we are born in a set of circumstances that shape us initially. I was born in the Midwest, grew up in the Midwest.
PHIL DONAHUE: You're Catholic too.
ANDREW BACEVICH: I was born in a Catholic family, a seriously Catholic family. I continue to be a Catholic. It was in the '50s and '60s prior to Vietnam when I was a kid, the overhang of World War II was still very prominent. Both of my parents were World War II veterans. So it was a patriotic environment in which patriotism was clearly connected to military service. And at a time when patriotism didn't necessarily encourage questions.
And when I graduated from West Point, became a serving officer for a period of time, in a sense, I continued to be in that environment. When I got out of the army, at the end of the Cold War, never having expected that the Cold War was going to end.
I mean, I viewed it from my youth as, it's just a permanent fact of international relations. I expected that now that this protracted emergency has ended, that we would become different. The emergency's over. We're going to become a normal nation now. And therefore, we're going to stop doing some of the things that we said we had to do during the Cold War.
I think the eye-opening thing for me was that rather than becoming a normal nation, we continued the pattern of behavior that we had engaged in during the Cold War only more so. We became more committed to military power. We became more persuaded that through the use of military power, we could achieve our purposes in the world and could advance the well-being of the American people at home.
And I found that shocking. And since then, I have becoming absolutely convinced that that was a fundamental error. We are the strongest military power in the world. And in some measures, we may be the strongest military power that the world has ever seen. But that's not been good for the country. Now I'm not a pacifist. I don't want to have a weak military. I want to have a strong military.
But I want to have a military that is, in fact, is configured and used to advance the well-being of us, with no pretentions that we can somehow shape the world to do our bidding. Rather, a military that is configured with an acute awareness of the things we need here at home, of our shortcomings. It's fascinating to me to hear President Obama say that over and over again.
And then to see President Obama not act on that inclination. He seems to understand at some level that this militarization of US policy, and this militarization of the American mentality, that there's something wrong there. And yet as ostensibly the most powerful man in the world, he's done next to nothing to reverse it. And my guess is that, you know, 50 years from now, if people are -- when historians are evaluating his presidency, that'll be one of the things that he's really going to get marked down on.
PHIL DONAHUE: I don't understand that either. We were so, the liberals were so thrilled, when he was elected. And he's, he hasn't closed Guantanamo, habeas is gone, we have people in cages, for over, almost 15 years now, no letters home, nothing.
ANDREW BACEVICH: Some of them no charges.
PHIL DONAHUE: No, not even charged. We're peeking in windows, listening in on mail, listening in on phone calls, reading mail. I mean, the Bill of Rights has just collapsed. And the American people are standing mute.
ANDREW BACEVICH: Well, I'm a conservative, not a liberal. And I think that part of the problem was -- although I voted for President Obama -- I think part of the problem is that you weren't listening. He said: "The Iraq War is a stupid war. Elect me. I will end the Iraq War. Oh, by the way, elect me, and I will expand the Afghanistan War."
And those are actually two promises that he fulfilled. My guess is that the people who were most enthusiastic about Obama, when he was running for president the first time, they weren't listening to that second half of the equation. He was never a dove. I mean, he, the Democratic Party, the mainstream of the Democratic Party is as militarized as the mainstream of the Republican Party.
I’m not blaming Obama for that. That was Bill Clinton's doing.
If you go back and look at the way Clinton portrayed himself back in 1992, before he won, he made it very clear that hawkish Democrats had regained control of their party. And indeed, if you look at Bill Clinton's performance in office, I mean, I think we've forgotten about this. Here's a guy who intervened in more places, more times, under more different circumstances than any of his predecessors.
So we've got two parties that despite their differences, in some respects, we've got two parties equally committed to the proposition that it is imperative to maintain global military supremacy, not simply strength, and who believed that somehow or other the adroit use of this military power is going to be able to bring peace. I don't know. And both parties are equally wrong.
PHIL DONAHUE: I know you're a New Englander. And you in your book "Breach of Trust" you make an observation that I don't I no one else would make, certainly not in the Boston area. You saw the United States military establishment use the Red Sox to promote pride, pride in the military, all good, all the time.
And they actually recreated a homecoming of a woman, Navy, who at first appeared on the big Jumbotron waving at her family. And of course the place erupted in cheers and the next thing you know from behind, a flag, she appeared real. And they were witness to well something that had to make you cry. She ran to embrace her family, and then the jets flew over. What's wrong with that?
ANDREW BACEVICH: Well, it's the Red Sox exploiting the military and the military exploiting the Red Sox. But both of them together in a sense are manipulating the American people. And they're encouraging the American people to think that to go to the ballgame on the 4th of July and sing the national anthem and clap for their troops that are on the field.
And then to react emotionally to this contrived reunion all of that is intended to persuade the American people that they have acquitted their responsibility to the troops. That when we say, "We support the troops," and we all say, "We support the troops," that that suffices. I go to the ballgame, I clap, I get teary-eyed, and then when they say, "Play ball," I buy a beer and basically forget about the episode.
And my argument in the book is that that's not good enough. My argument in the book is that in many respects, that's, well, it's an exercise in what Dietrich Bonhoeffer called "cheap grace." Grace you award yourself without having earned. Grace that enables you to feel that you are virtuous when in fact you are complicit in wrongdoing. And I think that actually describes the relationship between the American people and the American military.
Now some people will be offended to hear me say that. But my argument would be that our first obligation to those we love, to those we care about, is to protect them, to preserve them, to keep them out of harm. And therefore, if indeed we love the troops, if indeed we regarded them as the ultimate manifestation of what is good about our country, then we would all want to make sure that they were only sent in harm's way when absolutely necessary.
We would insist that they should not be abused. Now since 9/11, they have been abused. Particularly the American Army and the United States Marine Corps have been abused. And I think that that's wrong. I think that it's undemocratic, I think that it's immoral and I think that the American people need to be called on it.
PHIL DONAHUE: Andrew Bacevich, Professor of History, Boston University, graduate of West Point, Army veteran, thank you very much for this very informative hour.
ANDREW BACEVICH: Thank you.
© 2013 Public Affairs Television, Inc. All rights reserved.

quinta-feira, julho 25, 2013

Fim de ciclo (mais um)



Tese finda. Ainda várias ideias do que poderia adicionar, algumas coisas que seria arriscado manter, observações diversas, possibilidade de erros terem escapado... Não importa, o PDF foi gerado, um dos membros da banca já até a tem na caixa postal. Falta driblar os feriados papais no Rio de Janeiro e providenciar as cópias impressas para os outros professores. E agora... Vazio? Não exatamente, não é um vácuo ruim. Mas o foco no trabalho ainda não ganhou um substituto. Nestas últimas semanas, até me dei ao luxo de ler um romance nas idas e vindas do trabalho, mas sabia em que aplicar a maior parte de minhas energias. E agora? HQs? Leituras acadêmicas ainda? Um filme de recompensa por esta noite? Tudo que sei é que é bom ter opções sem peso na consciência. 

Tanta coisa não entrou no trabalho. Falta de tempo, falta de espaço... O mesmo de sempre, diga-se. Haverá alguém que diga que fez a tese ou dissertação que queria? Se há, nunca ouvi falar, deve ser alguma lenda urbana da academia. Mas valeu muito a pena esse doutorado. Fiz amigos, vi um pouco do mundo, entendi algumas coisas e continuo perplexo diante de outras. Oportunidades valiosas de trabalho apareceram e me ajudaram muito. Foram anos de boas recordações. Agora, resta aguardar a defesa, quando provavelmente vou apanhar um pouco -- "Você diz isso aqui, mas ali você diz outra coisa", "Por que você não aprofundou este ponto?" ou ainda "Por que você não me leu!?" (juro que esta foi caso verídico) -- e ouvir alguns elogios. Sim, elogios, pois sei que minhas imperfeitas páginas têm também suas virtudes. Nenhuma pesquisa é realmente perdida quando feita com honestidade e gosto, e a minha tem os dois. Certamente há coisas que adoraria ter explorado, mas, quando seu último capítulo passou das 80 páginas e o penúltimo tem quase 100, é preciso saber parar. Uma tese não é o último trabalho da vida, afinal de contas; é só mais um degrau numa carreira que espero ser bem longa.

Este é um ano de ritos de passagem. Doutoramento, volta à escola, casamento. O Rodrigo 2014 será bem diferente da versão 2013, ou será o mesmo com alguns stats a mais. Incrível como essas mudanças podem ser rápidas. Ainda ontem era 2009, ou seria 2007? "Tudo é rápido como o vento." Indeed.

segunda-feira, maio 13, 2013

Jesus e a resistência ao mal



Uma das maravilhas de ter um leitor de livros eletrônicos como o Kindle -- e falo isso como um fã de livros físicos que sempre desprezou o oba-oba sofre o "fim do livro" -- é a possibilidade de acesso quase instantâneo a obras que, de outra forma, eu levaria pelo menos um mês para receber. O custo menor e a não ocupação de espaço físico também são ótimos atrativos. Consequentemente, a variedade do meu acervo digital é expressiva e, numa mesma sessão de leitura, posso navegar por uma dúzia de livros sem grandes problemas.  Nisso, tendo planejado rever um livro para a minha tese, acabei dedicando minha tradicional leitura-em-viagem-longa-de-ônibus a um tema que sempre me intrigou: a não-violência nos ensinos de Jesus.

"Não resistir ao mal", "dar a outra face"... As passagens de Mateus 5:38-39 são conhecidas. O que elas querem dizer, nem tanto. Para uns, elas exortam ao sofrimento passivo, a uma forma de transcendência diante do sofrimento imposto por outrem; para outros, elas seriam uma recomendação impossível e ridícula de um rezador que buscaria noutro mundo o que deveria, minimamente, tentar construir no aqui e agora. Mesmo interpretações mais pragmáticas, como os comentários de Allan Kardec, partem da ideia da renúncia à vingança, que ainda é basicamente uma atitude negativa, um não fazer. Mas, então, o que se deve fazer? Como fazer cessar, por exemplo, uma agressão contínua ou uma situação injusta? No extremo, que resposta se deve dar à velha questão sobre o que fazer diante de Hitler?

Uma resposta muito interessante é dada por Walter Wink, autor do livro acima. Professor de Interpretação Bíblica num seminário de Nova York, Wink faz uma leitura dessas passagens a partir da resistência não violenta. Segundo ele, o ponto chave é a péssima tradução do termo antistenai, traduzido simplesmente como "resistir" (eu verifiquei uma dúzia de traduções inglesas, e não havia uma que fugisse ao padrão). Acontece que antistenai não significa qualquer resistência; ele se refere especificamente a uma resistência pela força, violenta, e no contexto bíblico é usada na maioria das vezes no sentido militar. (Ele não diz em que outros sentidos a palavra é usada, entretanto.) Por isso, Wink situa os exemplos que Jesus dá em seguida no contexto cultural da Palestina do século I, e o resultado é surpreendente. Mesmo achando que ele exagera em algumas coisas (ele era um ativista, parece), vale muito a leitura:

(Interessados em traduções alternativas dos Evangelhos devem dar uma olhada também nas de André Chouraqui. O que ele faz com o Sermão da Montanha, substituindo o tradicional "Bem-aventurados..." por "Em marcha..." é de arrepiar.)
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De http://www.cpt.org/files/BN%20-%20Jesus'%20Third%20Way.pdf.

TURN THE OTHER CHEEK


The examples that follow confirm this reading. "If anyone strikes you on the right cheek, turn the other also" (Matt. 5:39b). You are probably imagining a blow with the right fist. But such a blow would fall on the left cheek. To hit the right cheek with a fist would require the left hand. But the left hand could be used only for unclean tasks; at Qumran, a Jewish religious community of Jesus' day, to gesture with the left hand meant exclusion from the meeting and penance for ten days. To grasp this you must physically try it: how would you hit the other's right cheek with your right hand? If you have tried it, you will know: the only feasible blow is a backhand.

The backhand was not a blow to injure, but to insult, humiliate, degrade. It was not administered to an equal, but to an inferior. Masters backhanded slaves; husbands, wives; parents, children; Romans, Jews. The whole point of the blow was to force someone who was out of line back into place.

Notice Jesus' audience: "If anyone strikes you." These are people used to being thus degraded. He is saying to them, "Re-fuse to accept this kind of treatment anymore. If they backhand you, turn the other cheek." (Now you really need to physically enact this to see the problem.) By turning the cheek, the servant makes it impossible for the master to use the backhand again: his nose is in the way. And anyway, it's like telling a joke twice; if it didn't work the first time, it simply won't work. The left cheek now offers a perfect target for a blow with the right fist; but only equals fought with fists, as we know from Jewish sources, and the last thing the master wishes to do is to establish this underling's equality. This act of defiance renders the master incapable of asserting his dominance in this relationship. He can have the slave beaten, but he can no longer cow him. By turning the cheek, then, the "inferior" is saying: "I'm a human being, just like you. I refuse to be humiliated any longer. I am your equal. I am a child of God. I won't take it anymore."

Such defiance is no way to avoid trouble. Meek acquiescence is what the master wants. Such "cheeky" behavior may call down a flogging, or worse. But the point has been made. The Powers That Be have lost their power to make people submit. And when large numbers begin behaving thus (and Jesus was addressing a crowd), you have a social revolution on your hands.

In that world of honor and shaming, the "superior" has been rendered impotent to instill shame in a subordinate. He has been stripped of his power to dehumanize the other. As Gandhi taught, "The first principle of nonviolent action is that of non-cooperation with everything humiliating."

How different this is from the usual view that this passage teaches us to turn the other cheek so our batterer can simply clobber us again! How often that interpretation has been fed to battered wives and children. And it was never what Jesus intended in the least. To such victims he advises, "Stand up for yourselves, defy your masters, assert your humanity; but don't answer the oppressor in kind. Find a new, third way that is neither cowardly submission nor violent reprisal."




terça-feira, março 19, 2013

Howard Zinn e o problema da instrumentalização política da história



BOOKSMARCH 19, 2013

Agit-ProfHoward Zinn's influential mutilations of American history

In the 1980s, in the faculty-filled suburbs west of Boston, the historian Howard Zinn was something of a folk hero. The Boston Globe, where Zinn published a column, ran stories of his battles with the dictatorial John Silber, the president of Boston University, who cracked down on unions, censored student protests, and denied pay raises to enemies such as Zinn. When it was learned that the National Labor Relations Board had reinstated service workers who had been fired for striking, or that the courts upheld a student’s right to hang a “divest” banner from his window, a wave of satisfaction would surge from Cambridge to Brookline to Newton to Wellesley. As Silber’s chief nemesis, Zinn—handsome in profile, gentle in manner—made for a winning poster boy for anyone who reviled Silber’s high-handed rule.

As a faculty brat in those years, I was doubly enamored of Zinn after a classmate gave me A People’s History of the United States, his now-famous victims’-eye panorama of the American experience. In my adolescent rebelliousness, I thrilled to Zinn’s deflation of what he presented as the myths of standard-issue history. Do you know that the Declaration of Independence charged King George with fomenting slave rebellions and attacks from “merciless Indian Savages”? That James Polk started a war with Mexico as a pretext for annexing California? That Eugene Debs was jailed for calling World War I a war of conquest and plunder? Perhaps you do, if you are moderately well-read in American history. And if you are very well-read, you also know that these statements themselves are problematic simplifications. But like most sixteen-year-olds, I didn’t know any of this. Mischievously—subversively—A People’s History whispered that everything I had learned in school was a sugar-coated fairy tale, if not a deliberate lie. Now I knew.
A PEOPLE’S HISTORY WHIS- PERED THAT EVERYTHING I HAD LEARNED IN SCHOOL WAS A SUGAR-COATED FAIRY TALE

What I didn’t realize was that the orthodox version of the American past that Howard Zinn spent his life debunking was by the 1980s no longer quite as hegemonic as Zinn made out. Even my high school history teacher marked Columbus Day by explaining that the celebrated “discoverer” of America had plundered Hispaniola for its gold and that, in acts of barbarism that would later be classified as genocide, Columbus’s men had butchered the native Arawaks, slicing off limbs for sport and turning their scrotums into change-purses. (This last detail stuck vividly in the teenage mind.) That Mr. MacDougall was conversant with radical scholarship such as Zinn’s suggests that much had changed from the days when Zinn himself had imbibed uncritical schoolbook accounts of the American story. True, in the popular books and public ceremonies of the 1980s, you could still find a whitewashed tale of the nation’s past, as you can today; and many cities around the country shielded their charges from such heresies. But as far as historians were concerned, the sacred cows that Howard Zinn was purporting to gore had already been slaughtered many times. As Jon Wiener noted in the Journal of American History, “during the early seventies … of all the changes in the profession, the institutionalization of radical history was the most remarkable.”

It is no secret that the radical historians of the 1960s—and more basically, the infusion of that decade’s fiercely questioning spirit into intellectual life—transformed historical inquiry. Almost half a century has now passed since a new tide of work upended interpretations of subjects from the Civil War to the Cold War and legitimized whole fields of research, notably Afro-American history and women’s history. In short order, these new fields and 
frameworks became central to the discipline. This mainstreaming of radical history owes more to the flow of deep currents of academic thought than it does to the person of Howard Zinn. But Zinn deserves a share of responsibility. As Martin Dubermannotes in his interesting but flawed biography of Zinn, A People’s History of the United States has long been a publishing sensation, having sold more than two million copies in thirty-plus years, and its transgressive vapors still beguile young minds. To be sure, when they get to college, many of these students continue to read books, including works of history. And some of them come to realize that Zinn’s famous book is—for reasons that Duberman admirably makes clear—a pretty lousy piece of work.
http://www.newrepublic.com/sites/default/files/u35952/howard_zinn_bryan_bedder_getty_images_01_22_2009_242x162.jpg
Bryan Bedder/Getty Images
Howard Zinn, 2009

Martin Duberman is himself a veteran of the 1960s generation, an admired and pathbreaking historian who began his career writing on Charles Francis Adams and James Russell Lowell and went on to pioneerthe study of gay history. He knew Zinn and shared his politics, yet he narrates Zinn’s life fairly and dispassionately. And also, alas, diffidently: there is a conspicuous refusal throughout the book to comment on Zinn’s more outrageous or obtuse political positions. Duberman quotes Zinn at the time of Robert Kennedy’s murder saying that the American people’s collective anguish constituted “one of the great acts of hypocrisy in world history…. If we were to tell the truth, we would say that murderers are wearing mourning clothes today…. Is murder only the killing of important men by unimportant men? Is it not also the killing of unimportant men by important men? Are not governments the greatest murderers of all?” Duberman does not remark upon, or even register, the perversity 
of this reaction.

Also troubling, Duberman descends into needlessly snide or polemical asides, to the detriment of the credibility he elsewhere takes pains to uphold. This is how he summarizes a conversation between Nixon and Kissinger about bombing Cambodia: “In other words, Let’s git us a little mass murder.” Elsewhere, sympathizing with Zinn’s dim view of the justice system, Duberman writes: “Presidential pardons are reserved for the likes of Richard Nixon and his vice president Spiro Agnew.” The offhand sarcasm here is compounded by a factual error—Agnew was never pardoned—which, unfortunately, is not an isolated one. Duberman awards Daniel Patrick Moynihan the title of senator while he is still in the Nixon White House, and Lyndon Johnson, never known as a religious zealot, is morphed into Ann Coulter, discordantly described by Duberman as endorsing “the country’s mission to spread Christianity and ‘democracy.’ ” Duberman’s account of Zinn’s life is free from snark, but it suffers from the opposite vice: an overly familiar tone creeps into his prose, particularly when he comes to Zinn’s personal relations. He takes up the touchy subject of Zinn’s extramarital affairs, which is fair enough, but when he reports that Zinn’s wife learned of these liaisons, Duberman dilates at length on whether “they initially and explicitly committed to sexual monogamy.” This is not what one picks up a biography of Howard Zinn to know.
Duberman draws judiciously from interviews, a passel of letters, and Zinn’s own memoirs to reconstruct his subject’s early life. Born in 1922, the son of immigrants from Russia and Ukraine, Zinn grew up in a hardscrabble, working-class Brooklyn household. Zinn’s father Eddie sold fruit from a pushcart and, during the Depression, dug ditches and cleaned windows. When Eddie ordered a complete set of Dickens’s works from an ad in the New York Post, Howard devoured every volume. By his late teens, his reading had veered into politics, especially Marxism. Duberman suggests that unlike some friends, Zinn refrained from joining the Communist Party, which at the time of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939 was losing its allure. On this point Duberman contradicts, among others, August Meier and Elliot Rudwick, who write in Black History and the Historical Profession, 1915-1980 that Zinn was “an active party member for almost a decade.” Whatever the truth, Zinn’s lifelong leftism was forged in those years.

For many young men World War II was a clarifying event, curing them of the isolationism or pacifism that had been in vogue after World War I. Zinn traveled the opposite route. Having joined the Air Force in 1943, he emerged from his wartime service scarred by America’s remorseless use of its military. In the war’s last weeks, Zinn later recalled, his squadron was ordered to use a horrific new weapon, called napalm, on a French resort town—solely, he believed, to test its potency. He concluded that in “modern warfare, being massive, indiscriminate killing of people is a means so horrendous that no end can justify it … to retaliate against violence with more violence [is] to multiply the cruelties which you set out to stop.” After reading John Hersey’s Hiroshima, Zinn decided that the dropping of the atomic bomb on Japan was an indefensible atrocity. While not endorsing a moral equivalence between fascism and liberalism, Zinn found the flaws of the latter, not the former, gnawing at him—an unusual position, to say the least, in the time of the Holocaust.

After college on the G. I. Bill at what is now New York University, Zinn enrolled at Columbia to pursue a Ph.D. in history, continuing his political activities around New York City. He wrote a creditable dissertation, on Fiorello La Guardia, which is still occasionally cited by scholars and which would constitute Zinn’s only sustained engagement with archival documents. The well-received manuscript earned Zinn an offer from Albert Manley, the president of Spelman College, the black women’s college in Atlanta, to chair the school’s history and social sciences department. So in 1956, Zinn, his wife, and their two young children packed up their Chevrolet and headed South. At Spelman, the fledgling civil rights movement was attracting the middle-class black college students who would become its vanguard. Zinn’s apartment provided a gathering place for the young activists.

The fight for racial equality consumed his time at Spelman, and he became an adviser to the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, formed during the lunch counter sit-ins of 1960. Zinn poured his heart into this historic and righteous undertaking, bringing him into contact with the movement’s leaders. He would remain loyal to  the SNCC even after its controversial ouster in 1966 of its chairman John Lewis in favor of Stokely Carmichael, to the dismay of Martin Luther King, Jr., Bayard Rustin, and other national movement leaders. Zinn’s activism led to his second book, SNCC: The New Abolitionists, charitably described by Duberman as “an on-the-spot work of reportage”—personal observation might be a better term—“rather than a comprehensive scholarly account.” 

Also appearing in 1964 was The Southern Mystique, a collection of Zinn’s writings on civil rights (mostly published previously), which promised to herald his arrival as an intellectual force. It was reviewed by C. Vann Woodward, Ralph Ellison, and Lillian Smith, but none found much to admire in it beyond Zinn’s agreeable prose and nature. They called his arguments shallow and mystifyingly detached from any discussion of the South’s unique historical experience. But if Zinn’s stature as a thinker failed to rise in these years, Duberman writes, his profile as an activist did, as his “flair for the theatrical” and his “genius at engaging an audience” won him speaking invitations and requests from leftist causes.

Although Zinn ran afoul of various nasty Southern martinets in the civil rights years, his worst antagonist turned out to be Spelman’s own president, Albert Manley. The university’s first black leader, Manley was “strict and autocratic,” Duberman writes; “forced to walk a tightrope between a limited endowment and white racist power,” he frowned on his students’ activism and Zinn’s encouragement of it. In 1963, Manley fired Zinn, ostensibly on scholarly grounds. Zinn mistakenly believed that he had tenure—how such an extraordinary confusion came to pass is not fully explained—and asked the American Association of University Professors for help. In the negotiations, Manley threatened to publicize an old incident in which local police found Zinn and a Spelman student alone in his car at night at the end of a cul-de-sac. Zinn insisted that nothing sexual had occurred, but he still did not want his wife, who was prone to depression, to find out. What really happened? Duberman says there is no way to know. Manley refused to yield, and the AAUP dropped the case. Zinn secured an offer from the government department of Boston University, and the family returned north.

As Zinn was throwing himself into the SNCC, many of his peers in the historical profession were throwing themselves into scholarship. Some were hard at work overturning the central assumptions of their fields, challenging what John Higham had labeled the “consensus” history of their predecessors—so called because this older generation had tended to discern patterns of ideological agreement in the American past more than the persistence of class struggle. In truth, while consensus historians did stress the relative placidity of America’s experience compared to Europe’s, they were not the Cold War cheerleaders that their successors caricatured. Some of them—C. Vann Woodward, Kenneth Stampp, John Hope Franklin, and even those favorite New Left whipping boys Richard Hofstadter and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.—produced work that was in its own way powerfully revisionist, in some cases paving the way for the radicals who followed. Still, it was the young generation of the 1960s that broke open the limits of what constituted legitimate and respected history.

The shifts that the radical historians of the 1960s triggered were diverse enough to defy encapsulation. A strict taxonomy might demarcate differences between the self-consciously Marxist work of an early wave, whose members included current or former Communists, Trotskyists, and Schachtmanites, and that of a younger cohort who listed toward anarchism and the counterculture. It might also distinguish between the earlier work of figures such as James Weinstein and Christopher Lasch, which focused on politics with a strong anti-liberal bent, and the “new social history” of the early 1970s, which tended to avoid or downplay politics except in the loosest sense, preferring investigations into social mobility, family life, or other topics that fell under the rubric of “history from the bottom up.” Radical history had other distinguishing traits, too, including an anti-Cold War framework that looked cynically at American motives abroad and—too often—benignly on the Soviet Union’s; and, at a methodological level, a disdain for the hoary conceit of objectivity, with some radicals maintaining that research should be unapologetically yoked to the political agenda of the New Left.
ZINN NEVER SEEMS TO HAVE GRASPED THAT SCHOLARSHIP BEGINS IN A FREEDOM TO EXPLORE TOPICS THAT MAY APPEAR REMOTE FROM TODAY’S PRESSING CONCERNS.
Zinn shared many of these tenets. He relentlessly criticized American policy and seems to have stayed silent about the Soviet Union. He wrote of his commitment to “value-laden historiography” and declared that historical research should be carried out to serve present-day political ends. Yet for all these affinities, Zinn remained aloof from the intellectual ferment of the seminar rooms, journal offices, and conferences where radical history was being born. At Wisconsin, where William Appleman Williams’s jaundiced view of America’s global role was most influential, the start-up journal Studies on the Left published work by Eugene Genovese, Ronald Radosh, Lloyd Gardner, Gabriel Kolko, and Staughton Lynd—the last a close friend of Zinn’s at Spelman in the early ’60s—but never Zinn. Nor did Zinn ever write for a journal of later vintage, the Radical History Review. Nor, according to Duberman, did he “participate in the necessary but time-consuming efforts that others … devotedly put into establishing the Radical Historians Caucus of the American Historical Association” or other professional ventures.

Zinn expressed his radicalism through activism—first on the Vietnam War (he sympathized with the NLF) and then on a host of successor issues, on and off campus. That activism, more than his writing, came to constitute his public identity. In 1971, Boston University hired a new president whose authoritarian tendencies made Spelman’s Manley look like Mister Rogers. John Silber, swaggering in from Texas, had a vendetta against the left, especially professors who politicized their research. But Silber’s ostensible concern for academic freedom was belied by his tyrannical style. Heedless of due process, intolerant of dissent, Silber imposed his will on the faculty and students, generating only more unrest. And Zinn became Silber’s archenemy, subject to capricious punishments and unwarranted invective. Duberman reports that when Zinn received an offer to teach in Paris and secured Herbert Marcuse to teach in his stead, Silber vetoed what should have been a routine leave of absence. Silber also denied Zinn promotions and raises for years. In 1982, with help from the AAUP, he won an appeal to gain his long-withheld back pay.
That Zinn deserved sympathy for his victimization by Silber, however, does not mean that his own ideas or pursuits were admirable. And Duberman, though averse to scrutinizing Zinn’s political views, is quite prepared to take on his callow notions about higher education. At B.U., Zinn regularly and cavalierly denounced prevailing academic standards, arguing that the university should teach “relevant” subjects and forego what he described as the “endless academic discussion” of “trivial or esoteric inquiry” that goes “nowhere into the real world.” Duberman doesn’t buy it. Relevance is an uncertain guide to those embarked on a long, tortuous path of scholarship. And the question of which topics are “trivial or esoteric,” Duberman notes, is hardly self-evident. The academic gatekeepers of the early 1960s would surely have deemed much of the “endless academic discussion” taken up by the New Left historians—was the class consciousness of workers forged on or off the shop floor?—to be inconsequential or arcane; yet to those who could glean what was at stake in the debate, the questions were significant. Zinn never seems to have grasped that scholarship differs from more perishable forms of writing precisely in that it begins in a freedom to explore topics that may appear remote from today’s pressing concerns but that can still change our understanding of the world.

Duberman is exceedingly gracious toward Zinn, praising his warm heart, his honorable intentions, his noble commitments. One could almost miss the damning portrait of Zinn’s thinking that ultimately emerges. But damning it is: just as his thoughts on scholarship appear jejune, so Zinn himself—his measure taken in full—comes across as a lazy, conventional theorist, with an undeveloped political philosophy. Zinn’s Marxism, for example, was muddled: “He never considered himself an ideologue,” Duberman writes. “Howard found the Marxian idea of redistributing society’s wealth according to need a congenial one, but he also felt considerable attraction to the anarchists’ anti-authoritarian stance. He was even willing to acknowledge now and then that capitalism had ‘developed the economy in an enormously impressive way,’ increasing ‘geometrically the number of goods available’—though failing to distribute them justly.” In the end, Duberman concludes, “Howard, in fact, wasn’t much interested in political theory, nor did he pretend to have a creative, original contribution to make in that regard.” Duberman is kind to spare Zinn the burden of working out his own “creative, original” philosophy, but the shortcoming cannot be so easily excused, given Zinn’s ambitions, any more than we can excuse Zinn’s trite calls for politically useful history. Duberman makes it easy to see why Zinn earned Silber’s contempt.

What liberated Zinn from Silber’s fist was the publication of A People’s History of the United States in 1980. The book sold well and garnered an American Book Award nomination. In the years after its publication, it consistently found new readers, especially after Matt Damon—who as a boy lived next door to Zinn—plugged it in the film Good Will Hunting. Damon later turned the book into a History Channel series, and in time it also launched a raft of spin-offs. By Zinn’s final years—he died in 2010—the franchise was earning him some $200,000 annually.

A People’s History caught the imagination of the public, or a portion of it, for several reasons. Foremost was its uncomplicated and ideologically attractive message, enlivened by Zinn’s palpable passion and customarily lucid prose. An easily drinkable blend of the radical history that was now ripe on the vine, the book gave readers the American experience as seen by the losers and the victims. Or as Zinn memorably put it: “the discovery of America from the viewpoint of the Arawaks, of the Constitution from the standpoint of the slaves, of Andrew Jackson as seen by the Cherokees, of the Civil War as seen by the New York Irish … the Gilded Age as seen by southern farmers, the First World War as seen by socialists, the Second World War as seen by pacifists, the New Deal as seen by blacks in Harlem, the postwar American empire as seen by peons in Latin America.” In casting himself in solidarity with grassroots movements of protest, Zinn found a winning formula: how could you not root for Zinn and his rag-tag cast of plucky underdogs against the slaveholders, robber barons, imperialists, and protectors of privilege?

Zinn justified his overt display of sympathy with a stark methodological declaration. He abjured any pretense of having written a comprehensive or balanced account. Having long ago disavowed objectivity, having dismissed even the hope of unpoliticized scholarship, Zinn stated plainly that he meant to take sides. Since “selection, simplification, [and] emphasis” were “inevitable,” what mattered was only which selections, simplifications, and emphases the historian chose. And while the canons of academic culture might hold that those choices, those acts of historical interpretation, were “technical problems of excellence,” Zinn said that they constituted “tools for contending social classes, races, nations.” Thus, even more than its sympathies for the proper set of good guys, A People’s History enchanted readers with its knowing iconoclasm. The Constitution, the Civil War, the dropping of the bomb on Hiroshima—all were self-serving acts, Zinn said, perpetrated by those in power to maintain power. In the post-Vietnam, post-Watergate era, this stance was alluring. To ascribe noble or even mixed motives to the powerful was to fall into a retrograde naïveté; but to share Zinn’s blanket contempt for society’s elites conferred a hip, superior cynicism. Moreover, it wasn’t just the particulars of American history that Zinn’s book claimed to expose: it was the enterprise of scholarly history itself. In reducing previous scholars’ interpretive arguments to “tools for contending social classes, races, nations,” Zinn was in effect saying that Big-Time History—with its formidable air of authority, its footnotes and archival documentation, its vetting by communities of expert scholars—had really just served to shore up the power of established elites and put down stirrings of protest.

Upon its publication, A People’s History won some kind words from critics praising its author’s effort to transmit the new academic arguments of the 1960s and 1970s to wider audiences. But on the whole the reviews were not kind. The cultural historian Michael Kammen called the book a “scissors-and-paste-pot job” and deemed the book’s “bottom up” history to be “as unsatisfactory as ‘elitist’ history.” He pointed out that it was not too much to expect a book of 600 pages to include America’s “grandeur as well as tragedy, magnanimity as well as muddle, honor as well as shame.” In the New York Times, Eric Foner, something of a radical historian himself, explained why Zinn’s bugaboo of “balance” was a red herring: historians are obliged to explore the viewpoints of elite actors, however unattractive, not to parcel out sympathy in proper proportions, but to show, in a faithful account of the past, the interconnectedness of the rulers and ruled, and of all strata of society, and how one group’s experiences influence another’s. But Zinn reduced historical analysis to political opinion. He assessed a work of history by its author’s partisan loyalties, not its arguments about causation, influence, motivation, significance, experience, or other problems he deemed “technical” in nature.
THE FATAL FLAW OF ZINN’S HISTORICAL WORK IS THE SHALLOWNESS OF HIS CRITIQUE OF SCHOLARLY DETACHMENT.

Despite his soft spot for Zinn personally, Duberman doesn’t flinch from rehearsing these and other flaws. “Sometimes A People’s History lacks nuance,” he writes (ever so gently), “with the world divided into oppressors and oppressed, villains or heroes.” Not only did this division devolve quickly into Manichaeism; it also trivialized Zinn’s own heroes by depicting their labors as ineffectual. “The history of the U.S.,” Duberman notes, “is treated as mainly the story of relentless exploitation and deceit.” Even the civil rights movement is regarded in A People’s History as little more than a brief surge of activism that ended in burned-out ghettos, persistent inequality, continued racial conflict, and white indifference.

Yet when it comes to Zinn’s demand for history to be judged for its political utility, Duberman is finally too indulgent. He can never bring himself to say that the fatal flaw of Zinn’s historical work is the shallowness, indeed the fallaciousness, of his critique of scholarly detachment. Zinn rests satisfied with what strikes him as the scandalous revelation that claims of objectivity often mask ideological predilections. Imagine! And on the basis of this sophomoric insight, he renounces the ideals of objectivity and empirical responsibility, and makes the dubious leap to the notion that a historian need only lay his ideological cards on the table and tell whatever history he chooses. He aligns himself with the famous line from the British historian James Anthony Froude, who asked rhetorically if history “was like a child’s box of letters, with which we can spell any word we please. We have only to pick out such letters as we want, arrange them as we like, and say nothing about those which do not suit our purpose.” Froude made this observation in the middle of the nineteenth century.

Martin Duberman, then, shows himself to be a more subtle and probing historian than Howard Zinn. He navigates artfully between sympathy and criticism, recognizing complexity where Zinn prefers simplicity. But in the end Zinn matters to us not because of his own scholarly contributions, which were meager, but as an expression of the radical history of the 1960s. Unfortunately, Duberman is not particularly clear-eyed about—or much 
given to examine—the merits of radical history itself, of which Zinn was only a small part. Perhaps hemmed in by his own political leanings, Duberman mostly avoids the larger set of questions.

The tenet of radical history that has aged least well is its subordination of analytical problems to political sympathies. The New Left historians were hardly the first cohort of scholars to enlist history in the service of a political crusade or a social agenda. The idea was put forward, in different form, by the Progressive historians of Charles Beard’s time, notably James Harvey Robinson, and many subsequent schools and individuals later embraced it, including some of the Cold War anti-Communists against whom the New Left historians were rebelling. Conversely, many scholarly-minded radical historians grasped the foolishness, even the danger, of allowing present-day politics to shape one’s readings of past events. It was Christopher Lasch who decried “the worst features of progressive historiography reappear[ing] under the auspices of the new left: drastic simplification of issues; … reading present concerns back into the past; strident partisanship.” Quoting Zinn’s directive for historians to decide “from a particular ethical base what is the action-need of the moment and to concentrate on that aspect of the truth-complex which fulfills that need,” Lasch growled: “In the face of such critics, the consensus historians need no defense.”1

The question of politicized scholarship was in fact deeply divisive not just between the “consensus” historians and the New Left historians, but also among the New Left historians themselves. Some of the young radicals, such as Lasch, Weinstein, and Genovese, insisted that the political or social influence of their scholarship would of necessity unfold slowly, incrementally, and through the sinuous, indirect paths of the culture. For all their leftist bona fides, these men agreed with their stodgy forebears that the intellectual had to hew to the highest standards of rigor; it was by the strength of their scholarship that they might revise entrenched beliefs that gave rise to the social conditions that, as a political matter, they decried. Genovese, most vociferously, flatly rejected the siren song of “relevant” history: he, too, hoped at the time for a socialist future, but he believed that it was best served by history that was true to the evidence, valid in its interpretations, and competent in its execution. This rift in the New Left between “scholars” and “activists” eventually led to the collapse of Studies on the Left, as well as to a donnybrook at the meeting of the American Historical Association in 1969, at which Staughton Lynd, a leading activist, ran for association president on an insurgent plank, prompting the cantankerous Genovese—still very much a radical—to bellow from the floor that Lynd and his allies were “totalitarians.”2

Lynd's insurrection sputtered, but his and Zinn’s position wormed its way into the thinking of generations of graduate students, and it is distressingly easy today to find tendentious scholarship that exhibits a Zinn-like habit of judging historical acts and actors by their contemporary utility. As much as radical history contributed invaluable new arguments and perspectives to historical scholarship, it has also left an unhappy legacy of confusing or commingling political and scholarly goals. At its most egregious, this confusion takes the form of polemical potboilers such as Zinn’s or, worse, propagandistic screeds such as Peter Kuznick’s and Oliver Stone’s The Untold History of the United States. (Three decades after Zinn, five decades after William Appleman Williams, it takes chutzpah to claim that a conspiracy-laden tale about America’s unremitting malice has somehow been “untold,” but then one wouldn’t expect Stone’s history to be any more subtle than his movies.) Such cant will usually be called out by responsible historians, left, right, or center. More troubling is that “the pragmatic fallacy,” as David Hackett Fischer called it, has insinuated itself into a good deal of historical literature even by respected and able historians, at a level deep enough to be nearly invisible. While excellent work is done by self-identified leftists, too much academic work today assumes such dubious premises as (to name but a few) the superiority of socialism to a mixed economy, the inherent malignancy of American intervention abroad, and the signal virtue of the left itself. Franklin Roosevelt’s rescue of capitalism is routinely treated as a disappointment because he did not go all the way to socialism. Truman’s suspicion of Stalin is treated as short-sightedness or war-mongering. Anti-Communism of even the most discerning sort is lumped in with McCarthyism as an expression of mass paranoia. Labor’s mid-century decisions to work with management to secure good wages and benefits are seen as selling out. And too seldom is it acknowledged that throughout its history the left has operated from low motives as well as high ones, and has caused social harm as well as social improvement, and has destroyed as well as created.

Likewise, in the academic realm, left-wing radicalism has bequeathed a mixed and uneven legacy. At many times in our national experience, there have been radicals who have applied needed pressure to those in the seats of institutional power, forcing them to change unjust practices, reconsider self-serving conclusions, and honor unfulfilled principles. At such times, the radicals’ work has been most salutary, bringing greater equality and justice to the political sphere, opening horizons in the intellectual world. But there have been times, too, when some radicals—political and intellectual—have embraced zealotry and maximalism, or betrayed their own ideals, and allowed their impatience with the imperfections of those in power to lead them into deluded or destructive movements. In writing as or about radicals, historians owe it to their readers to include the bad with the good, the ignoble with the noble—not in the service of “balance” but in the pursuit of intellectual honesty. The most regrettable aspect of Howard Zinn’s full and lusty life is not that he chose to ignore this responsibility. It is that he never seemed aware of it in the first place. 

David Greenberg is a professor of journalism and media studies and of history at Rutgers and the author of Nixon’s Shadow: The History of an Image (Norton), among other books.