domingo, novembro 26, 2006

A separação segundo Marguerite Yourcenar

Há alguns textos que procuramos uma vida inteira e não achamos. Sem o talento de escrevermos nós mesmos um equivalente, muitas vezes optamos por simplesmente calar, curtindo em silêncio as várias marés da alma. E eis que, um dia, quando a turbulência que nos fez buscá-los em primeiro lugar encontra-se sanada, deparamo-nos com tudo que gostaríamos de ter expressado antes, nos momentos cruciais que pontuam nossa vida com a intensidade incomum dos grandes marcos.

Este encontrei por puro acaso no scrapbook de uma pessoa com quem não mantinha contato há muito tempo. E acabou que uma visita casual para dar um singelo alô se tornou uma descoberta feliz. Assim, tenho uma dívida de gratidão com ela, e outra com Yourcenar por ser, nestes versos, o que Neruda e Gibran foram em outros tantos, também reproduzidos aqui de quando em vez. E como certa vez já disse de um dos poemas do grande poeta chileno, gostaria muito de ter tido o privilégio de ser autor das linhas que seguem -- mas aí já não seriam como são, e eu já não as quereria.

Mas chega de paradoxos. Deles já bastam aqueles inevitáveis a cada despedida.




Gherardo Perini

Não irei mais longe, Gherardo.
Não te acompanho mais porque o trabalho urge
e eu sou um homem velho. Sou um homem velho, Gherardo.
Às vezes, quando te entregas mais à ternura,
chegas a chamar-me teu pai. Mas eu não tenho filhos.
Nunca encontrei mulher tão bela como as minhas figuras de pedra,
mulher que ficasse horas imóvel sem falar,
como coisa necessária que não precisa de agir para ser,
e nos faz esquecer que o tempo passa porque está sempre presente.



Mulher que se deixe olhar sem sorrir nem corar
porque compreendeu que a beleza é qualquer coisa de grave.
As mulheres de pedra são mais castas que as outras,
e mais fiéis, porém, são estéreis.
Não há fenda por onde se possa introduzir nelas o prazer,
a morte, ou a semente de uma criança,
e por isso elas são menos frágeis.
Por vezes quebram-se e em cada pedaço de mármore
fica contida a sua beleza inteira, como Deus
que está em todas as coisas,
mas nada de estranho entra nelas que dilate o seu coração.
Os seres imperfeitos agitam-se e acasalam-se para se completarem,
mas as coisas só belas são solitárias como a dor humana.


Gherardo, não tenho filhos.
Eu bem sei que a maioria dos homens não tem propriamente um filho:
têm Tito, ou Caio, ou Pedro, e não é a mesma alegria.
Se eu tivesse um filho,
ele não se havia de parecer com a imagem que eu dele formara
antes de existir. Assim também as estátuas que faço
são diferentes daquelas que comecei por sonhar.
Mas Deus permite-se ser conscientemente criador.
Se fosses meu filho, Gherardo, eu não te amaria mais,
mas não teria que perguntar-me porquê.
Toda a minha vida procurei respostas a perguntas
que talvez não tenham resposta e perscrutei o mármore
como se a verdade se encontrasse no coração das pedras,
e espalhei as cores para pintar muralhas
como se se tratasse de fixar acordes sobre um enorme silêncio.
Tudo se cala, sabes, até a nossa alma —
ou então somos nós que não ouvimos.


Assim, tu partes.
Na minha idade já não se dá importância a uma separação,
mesmo que definitiva. Eu bem sei que os seres que amamos e que nos amam mais
se vão separando insensivelmente de nós a cada momento que passa.
É também deste modo que se vão separando de si próprios.
Estás sentado sobre essa pedra e julgas-te ainda aí,
mas o teu ser, voltado para o futuro, não adere mais ao que foi a tua vida,
e a tua ausência já começou. É certo que compreendo
que tudo isto é ilusão, como o resto, e que o futuro não existe.
Os homens que inventaram o tempo,
inventaram por contraste a eternidade, mas a negação do tempo
é tão vã como ele próprio. Não há nem passado nem futuro
mas apenas uma série de presentes sucessivos,
um caminho perpetuamente destruído e continuado
onde todos vamos avançando.


Estás sentado, Gherardo,
mas os teus pés estão assentes no solo
com a inquietação de quem experimenta o caminho.
Estás vestido com trajes do nosso século,
que hão-de parecer feios ou simplesmente estranhos quando o século
tiver passado pois as vestes não são mais que a caricatura do corpo.
Vejo-te nu. Tenho o dom de ver através das roupas o irradiar do corpo,
que é como os santos vêem as almas, segundo penso.
É um suplício quando são feios,
mas é um outro suplício quando são belos,
dessa beleza frágil que a vida e o tempo atacam por todos os lados
e acabarão por tomar-te,
mas neste momento és dono dela e tua será na abóbada da igreja
onde pintei a tua imagem. Mesmo que um dia
o teu espelho te não mostre mais que um retrato deformado
onde não ouses reconhecer-te, existirá sempre noutro sítio
o reflexo imóvel de ti.
E desse modo imobilizarei a tua alma também.


Tu já não me amas.
Se consentes em ouvir-me durante uma hora
é porque somos sempre indulgentes com aqueles que vamos deixar.
Ligaste-me e agora desligas-me.
Não te censuro, Gherardo.
O amor de alguém é um presente tão inesperado e tão pouco merecido
que devemos espantar-nos que não no-lo retirem mais cedo.
Não estou inquieto por aqueles que ainda não conheces,
ao encontro de quem vais e que porventura te esperam:
aquele que eles vão conhecer será diferente daquele
que eu julguei conhecer e creio amar.
Não se possui ninguém (mesmo os que pecam não o conseguem) e,
sendo a arte a única forma de posse verdadeira,
o que importa é recriar um ser e não prendê-lo.


Gherardo, não te enganes sobre as minhas lágrimas:
vale mais que os que amamos partam quando ainda conseguimos chorá-los.
Se ficasses, talvez a tua presença, ao sobrepor-se-lhe,
enfraquecesse a imagem que me importa conservar dela.
Tal como as tuas vestes não são mais que o invólucro do teu corpo,
assim tu também não és mais para mim
do que o invólucro de um outro que extraí de ti e que te vai sobreviver.


Gherardo, tu és agora mais belo que tu mesmo.
Só se possuem eternamente os amigos de quem nos separamos.


Marguerite Yourcenar, O tempo esse grande escultor

sábado, novembro 25, 2006

Músicas para uma noite quente de primavera

Já nostálgico do Video Games Live, um pouco de efervescente música "noturna" ao melhor estilo de uma das mais clássicas e duradouras séries dos jogos eletrônicos:

http://d2.ffshrine.org/soundtracks/Castlevania%20Curse%20of%20Darkness/17_-_a_toccata_into_blood_soaked_darkness.mp3

(Para ouvir, clique no link com o botão direito do mouse e escolha "Salvar destino como...".)

E para variar, uma viagem musical pelas diferentes civilizações da História, na trilha sonora de Civilization IV:

http://gh.ffshrine.org/soundtracks/3145

quinta-feira, novembro 23, 2006

Meditações do dia

"Um intelectual é alguém que achou algo mais interessante do que sexo."

Aldous Huxley



"Não pense que o amor, para ser genuíno, tem de ser extraordinário. O que precisamos é amar sem nos cansarmos."

Madre Teresa de Calcutá



"Vamos sempre ao encontro um do outro com um sorriso, pois o sorriso é o princípio do amor."

Madre Teresa de Calcutá

segunda-feira, novembro 20, 2006

Paz


"Quando o amor vos chamar, segui-o.
Embora seus caminhos sejam agrestes e escarpados.
E quando ele vos envolver com suas asas, cedei-lhe,
Embora a espada oculta na sua plumagem possa ferir-vos;
E quando ele vos falar, acreditai nele,
Embora sua voz possa despedaçar vossos sonhos como o vento devasta o jardim.

Pois, da mesma forma que o amor vos coroa, assim ele vos crucifica. E da mesma forma que contribui para vosso crescimento, trabalha para vossa poda.
E da mesma forma que alcança vossa altura e acaricia vossos ramos mais tenros que se embalam ao sol,
Assim também desce até vossas raízes e as sacode no seu apego à terra.

Como feixes de trigo, ele vos aperta junto ao seu coração.
Ele vos debulha para expor vossa nudez.
Ele vos peneira para libertar-vos das palhas.
Ele vos mói até a extrema brancura.
Ele vos amassa até que vos torneis maleáveis.
Então, ele vos leva ao fogo sagrado e vos transforma no pão místico do banquete sagrado de Deus.

Todas essas coisas, o amor operará em vós para que conheçais os segredos de vossos corações e, com esse conhecimento, vos convertais num fragmento do coração da Vida."


Gibran Khalil Gibran, O Profeta

sexta-feira, novembro 17, 2006

Leveza

Leve é o pássaro:
e a sua sombra voante,
mais leve.

E a cascata aérea
de sua garganta,
mais leve.

E o que lembra, ouvindo-se
deslizar seu canto,
mais leve.

E o desejo rápido
desse antigo instante,
mais leve.

E a fuga invisível
do amargo passante,
mais leve.

Cecília Meireles

Uma (gen)ética egoísta


A Sociobiologia, uma interessante abordagem do comportamento humano a partir do que seria a seleção natural, tem se tornado cada vez mais popular entre as pessoas informadas. Entretanto, não é preciso muito esforço para ver a facilidade com que seus postulados podem levar a uma repetição do que aconteceu, no século XIX, com o darwinismo: seu uso como justificativa para normas sociais e diretrizes éticas injustas e exclusivistas, o chamado darwinismo social cujo preceito básico era "Só os mais fortes sobrevivem", significando que "é natural e desejável que os mais fracos (fossem os pobres, os menos inteligentes, os de cor de pele diferente) pereçam". Este texto, colhido a partir dos Arts & Letters Daily, trata do assunto.
----------------------------
The Chronicle of Higher Education
The Chronicle Review
November 17, 2006

The Social Responsibility in Teaching Sociobiology


By DAVID P. BARASH

Socrates was made to drink hemlock for having "corrupted the youth of Athens." Is sociobiology or — as it is more commonly called these days — "evolutionary psychology" similarly corrupting? Although the study of evolution is, in my opinion, one of the most exciting and illuminating of all intellectual enterprises, there is at the same time, and not just in my opinion, something dark about the implications of natural selection for our own behavior.

Should we revise Pink Floyd's anthem "Another Brick in the Wall" — with its chorus "No dark sarcasm in the classroom/Teachers leave them kids alone" — to "No dark sociobiology in the classroom"? To answer this, we need first to examine that purported darkness.

Basically, it's a matter of selfishness. For a long time, evolution was thought to operate "for the good of the species," a conception that had a number of pro-social implications; that may be one reason why "species benefit" was so widely accepted, and why its overthrow took so long and was so vigorously resisted. Thus, if evolution somehow cares about the benefit enjoyed by a species, or by any other group larger than the individual, then it makes sense for natural selection to favor actions that contribute positively to that larger whole, even at the expense of the individual in question. Doing good therefore becomes doubly right: not just ethically correct but also biologically appropriate. In a world motivated by concern for the group rather than the individual, altruism is to be expected, since it would be "only natural" for an individual to suffer costs — and to do so willingly — so long as other species members come out ahead as a result.

Then came the revolution. Beginning in the 1960s with a series of paradigm-shifting papers by William D. Hamilton, a notable book by George C. Williams (Adaptation and Natural Selection), and with further clarifications in the early 1970s, especially by Robert L. Trivers and John Maynard Smith, and magisterially summarized in Edward O. Wilson's Sociobiology, the conceptual structure of modern evolutionary biology was changed — maybe not forever (it's a bit premature to conclude that), but into the foreseeable future. Sociobiology was born on the wings of this scientific paradigm shift, whose underlying manifesto holds that the evolutionary process works most effectively at the smallest unit: that of individuals and genes, rather than groups and species.

At first glance, none of this seems especially threatening. Moreover it has been liberating in the extreme, shedding new light on a wide range of animal and human social behavior. But at the same time, the individual- and gene-centered view of life offers, in a sense, a perspective that is profoundly selfish; hence Richard Dawkins's immensely influential book, The Selfish Gene. The basic idea has been so productive that it has rapidly become dogma: Living things compete with each other (more precisely, their constituent genes struggle with alternative copies) in a never-ending process of differential reproduction, using their bodies as vehicles, or tools, for achieving success. The result has been to validate a view of human motivations that seems to approve of personal selfishness while casting doubt on any self-abnegating actions, seeing a self-serving component behind any act, no matter how altruistic it might appear. Sociobiologists have thus become modern-day descendants of the cynical King Gama, from Gilbert and Sullivan's Princess Ida, who proudly announces his cynicism: "A charitable action I can skillfully dissect; And interested motives I'm delighted to detect."

Scientifically, such "detection" works. Ethically, however, it stinks: If the fundamental nature of living things — human beings included — is to joust endlessly with each other, each seeking to get ahead, then we're all mired in selfishness — a dark vision indeed.

It might ease the blow by noting that such a vision of human nature is hardly unique to modern evolutionary science. Thus, in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), David Hume wrote that "should a traveller, returning from a far country, bring us an account of men wholly different from any with whom we were ever acquainted ... who were entirely divested of avarice, ambition, or revenge; who knew no pleasure but friendship, generosity, and public spirit; we should immediately, from these circumstances, detect the falsehood, and prove him a liar, with the same certainty as if he had stuffed his narration with stories of centaurs and dragons, miracles and prodigies." Hume also noted, albeit playfully, "It is not irrational for me to prefer the destruction of half the world to the pricking of my finger." More than 200 years ago, people were made uncomfortable by such sentiments, and they still are.

Just as nature is said to abhor a vacuum, it abhors true altruism. Society, on the other hand, adores it. Most ethical systems advocate undiscriminating altruism: "Virtue," we are advised, "is its own reward." Such sentiments are immensely attractive, not only because they are how we would like other people to behave, but probably because at some level, we wish that we could do the same. As Bertolt Brecht notes in The Threepenny Opera, "We crave to be more kindly than we are," so much so that purveyors of good news — those who proclaim the "better angels of our nature" — nearly always receive a more enthusiastic reception than do those whose message is more dour.

Although people are widely urged to be kind, moral, altruistic, and so forth, which suggests that they are basically less kind, moral, altruistic, etc., than is desired, it is also common to give at least lip service to the precept that people are fundamentally good. It appears that there is a payoff in claiming — if not acting — as though others are good at heart. "Each of us will be well advised, on some suitable occasion," wrote Freud, in Civilization and Its Discontents, "to make a low bow to the deeply moral nature of mankind; it will help us to be generally popular and much will be forgiven us for it." Why are people generally so unkind to those who criticize the human species as being, at heart, unkind? Maybe because of worry that such critics might be seeking to justify their own unpleasantness by pointing to a general unpleasantness on the part of others. And maybe also because most people like to think of themselves as benevolent and altruistic, or at least, to think that other people think of them that way. It seems likely that a cynic is harder to bamboozle.

In Civilization and Its Discontents, perhaps his most pessimistic book, Freud went on to lament that one of education's sins is that "it does not prepare [children] for the aggressiveness of which they are destined to become the objects. In sending the young into life with such a false psychological orientation, education is behaving as though one were to equip people starting on a Polar expedition with summer clothing and maps of the Italian Lakes. In this it becomes evident that a certain misuse is being made of ethical demands. The strictness of those demands would not do so much harm if education were to say: 'This is how men ought to be, in order to be happy and to make others happy; but you have to reckon on their not being like that.' Instead of this the young are made to believe that everyone else fulfills those ethical demands — that is, that everyone else is virtuous. It is on this that the demand is based that the young, too, shall become virtuous."

At the same time, we can expect that society will often call for real altruism, not because it is good for the altruist but because it benefits those who receive. (If it were clearly good for the altruist, then society wouldn't have to call for it! In fact, cynics point out that it is precisely because altruism is generally not good for the altruist that social pressures are so often focused on producing it.) Friedrich Nietzsche was probably the most articulate spokesman for the view that society encourages self-sacrifice because the unselfish sucker is an asset to others: "Virtues (such as industriousness, obedience, chastity, piety, justness) are mostly injurious to their possessors. ... If you possess a virtue, ... you are its victim! But that is precisely why your neighbor praises your virtue. Praise of the selfless, sacrificing, virtuous ... is in any event not a product of the spirit of selflessness! One's 'neighbor' praises selflessness because he derives advantage from it."

If Nietzsche is correct, then there is probably a distressingly manipulative quality to morals, to most religious teachings, to the newspaper headlines that celebrate the hero who leaps into a raging river to rescue a drowning child, to local Good Citizenship Awards and PTA prizes.

"That man is good who does good to others," wrote the 17th-century French moralist Jean de La Bruyère. Nothing objectionable so far; indeed, it makes sense (especially for the "others"). But La Bruyère goes on, revealing a wicked pre-Nietzschean cynicism: "If he suffers on account of the good he does, he is very good; if he suffers at the hands of those to whom he has done good, then his goodness is so great that it could be enhanced only by greater suffering; and if he should die at their hands, his virtue can go no further; it is heroic, it is perfect."

Such "perfect" heroism can only be wished on one's worst enemies.

Exhortations to extreme selflessness are easy to parody, as not only unrealistic but also paradoxically self-serving insofar as the exhorter is likely to benefit at the expense of the one exhorted. Yet the more we learn about biology, the more sensible becomes the basic thrust of social ethics, precisely because nearly everyone, left to his or her devices, is likely to be selfish, probably more than is good for the rest of us. The philosopher and mathematician Bertrand Russell pointed out that "by the cultivation of large and generous desires ... men can be brought to act more than they do at present in a manner that is consistent with the general happiness of mankind." Society is therefore left with the responsibility to do a lot of cultivating.

Seen this way, a biologically appropriate wisdom begins to emerge from the various commandments and moral injunctions, nearly all of which can at least be interpreted as trying to get people to behave "better," that is, to develop and then act upon large and generous desires, to strive to be more amiable, more altruistic, less competitive, and less selfish than they might otherwise be.

Enter sociobiology. With its increasingly clear demonstration that Hume, Freud, Brecht, and Nietzsche (also Machiavelli and Hobbes) are basically onto something, and that selfishness resides in our very genes, it would seem not only that evolution is a dispiriting guide to human behavior, but also that the teaching of sociobiology (or evolutionary psychology) should be undertaken only with great caution. The renowned primatologist Sarah Hrdy accordingly questioned "whether sociobiology should be taught at the high-school level ... because it can be very threatening to students still in the process of shaping their own priorities," adding: "The whole message of sociobiology is oriented toward the success of the individual. ... Unless a student has a moral framework already in place, we could be producing social monsters by teaching this."

What to do? One possibility — unacceptable, I would hope, to most educators — would be to refrain altogether from teaching such dangerous truths. Teacher, leave them kids alone! Preferable, I submit, is to structure the teaching of sociobiology along the lines of sex education: Teach what we know, but do so in age-appropriate stages. Just as we would not bombard kindergartners with the details of condom use, we probably ought not instruct preteens in the finer points of sociobiology, especially since many of those are hidden even to those expected to do the teaching. For one thing, a deeper grasp of the evolutionary biology of altruism reveals that even though selfishness may well underlie much of our behavior, it is often achieved, paradoxically, via acts of altruism, as when individuals behave in a manner that enhances the ultimate success of genetic relatives. Here, selfishness at the level of genes produces altruism at the level of bodies. Ditto for "reciprocity," which, as Robert Trivers elegantly demonstrated more than three decades ago, can produce seemingly altruistic exchanges and moral obligations even between nonrelatives. Yet genetic selfishness underlies it all. Alexander Pope concluded, with some satisfaction, "That Reason, Passion, answer one great aim; That true Self-love and Social are the same."

Sociobiologists understand that there is an altruistic as well as a selfish side to the evolutionary coin. A half-baked introduction to the discipline, which pointed only to the latter, would therefore do students a substantial disservice. Moreover, gene-centered evolutionary thinking can also expand the sense of self and emphasize interrelatedness: Altruism aside, just consider all those genes for cellular metabolism, for neurotransmitters and basic body plans, all of them shared with every living thing, competing and pushing and somehow working things out on a small and increasingly crowded planet. There, by the grace of evolution, go a large part of "ourselves."

"Gene-centered theories are often reviled," writes the gene theorist David Haig, "because of their perceived implications for human societies. But even though genes may cajole, deceive, cheat, swindle, or steal, all in pursuit of their own replication, this does not mean that people must be similarly self-interested. Organisms are collective entities (like firms, communes, unions, charities, teams) and the behaviors and decisions of collective bodies need not mirror those of their individual members." To some extent, in short, we may even possess — gulp! — free will.

Beyond the question of what our genes may be up to and the extent to which we are independent of them, those expected to ponder the biology of their own "natural" inclinations ought also to be warned (more than once) about the "naturalistic fallacy," the presumption that things natural are, ipso facto, good. I'd even suggest pushing this further, and that the real test of our humanity might be whether we are willing, at least on occasion, to say no to our "natural" inclinations, thereby refusing go along with our selfish genes. To my knowledge, no other animal species is capable of doing that. More than any other living things, we are characterized by an almost unlimited repertoire; human beings are of the wilderness, with beasts inside, but much of the beastliness involves gene-based altruism no less than selfishness. (Recall the paradox that genetic selfishness is often promoted via altruism toward other individuals insofar as these recipients are likely to carry identical copies of the genes in question.)

Moreover, as Carl Sandburg put it, each human being is "the keeper of his zoo." Even that is not evidence of a lack of evolutionary influence; rather, it is a result of selection for being a good zookeeper. Socrates, we are told, elected to drink the hemlock when he could have followed a different path. Human beings are capable not only of understanding what the evolutionary process hath wrought, but also of deciding, in the clear light of reason as well as ethics, whether to follow.

David P. Barash is a professor of psychology at the University of Washington.

quinta-feira, novembro 16, 2006

Brilho Eterno de uma Mente sem Lembranças



Quanto você daria para esquecer? Eis a premissa desse filme tão original e interessante, delicado sem sombra de pieguice, cuja sinopse está aqui. Um filme para assistir e meditar.

Abaixo, o poema citado no filme e que o inspirou, com destaque para o trecho que lhe dá título.

From Eloisa to Abelard


"...Ah wretch! believ'd the spouse of God in vain,
Confess'd within the slave of love and man.
Assist me, Heav'n! but whence arose that pray'r?
Sprung it from piety, or from despair?
Ev'n here, where frozen chastity retires,
Love finds an altar for forbidden fires.
I ought to grieve, but cannot what I ought;
I mourn the lover, not lament the fault;
I view my crime, but kindle at the view,
Repent old pleasures, and solicit new;
Now turn'd to Heav'n, I weep my past offence,
Now think of thee, and curse my innocence.
Of all affliction taught a lover yet,
'Tis sure the hardest science to forget!
How shall I lose the sin, yet keep the sense,
And love th' offender, yet detest th' offence?
How the dear object from the crime remove,
Or how distinguish penitence from love?
Unequal task! a passion to resign,
For hearts so touch'd, so pierc'd, so lost as mine.
Ere such a soul regains its peaceful state,
How often must it love, how often hate!
How often hope, despair, resent, regret,
Conceal, disdain — do all things but forget.
But let Heav'n seize it, all at once 'tis fir'd;
Not touch'd, but rapt; not waken'd, but inspir'd!
Oh come! oh teach me nature to subdue,
Renounce my love, my life, myself — and you.
Fill my fond heart with God alone, for he
Alone can rival, can succeed to thee.

How happy is the blameless vestal's lot!
The world forgetting, by the world forgot.
Eternal sunshine of the spotless mind!
Each pray'r accepted, and each wish resign'd;
Labour and rest, that equal periods keep;
"Obedient slumbers that can wake and weep;"
Desires compos'd, affections ever ev'n,
Tears that delight, and sighs that waft to Heav'n.
Grace shines around her with serenest beams,
And whisp'ring angels prompt her golden dreams.
For her th' unfading rose of Eden blooms,
And wings of seraphs shed divine perfumes,
For her the Spouse prepares the bridal ring,
For her white virgins hymeneals sing,
To sounds of heav'nly harps she dies away,
And melts in visions of eternal day.

Far other dreams my erring soul employ,
Far other raptures, of unholy joy:
When at the close of each sad, sorrowing day,
Fancy restores what vengeance snatch'd away,
Then conscience sleeps, and leaving nature free,
All my loose soul unbounded springs to thee."

segunda-feira, novembro 13, 2006

Amores e águas turvas

Bridge over troubled water, de Paul Simon e Art Garfunkel, é uma melodia muito conhecida, comum em inúmeras coletâneas baratas de orquestras obscuras. É daquele tipo de música que, se ouvida mais de uma vez, "gruda" no cérebro e nos arrasta para um replay mental que pode durar dias a fio. Tendo-a ensaiado para um coral improvisado há mais de uma semana, eu mesmo ainda estou pagando esse preço, ouvindo-a internamente nas mais diversas horas do dia. Apesar desse "incômodo" -- é uma bela canção, embora repassá-la 3600 vezes não estivesse no plano original --, há um outro motivo pelo qual ela é notável: sua letra.

Antes, uma explicação. Boa parte das canções pop pode ser resumida a uns poucos tópicos de apelo supostamente universal e que se repetem, repetem, repetem... Talvez os mais comuns sejam a paixão não correspondida, a "dor-de-cotovelo", o desejo de desforra, o ciúme a tristeza pela perda, enfim, uma infinidade de variações sobre o "amor". Algumas dessas obras são lindíssimas, um sem-número é de composições banais, mas o que chama a atenção é que versam quase sempre sobre apenas um tipo de amor, o chamado "amor romântico". Essa preferência até se justifica, pela intensidade que caracteriza esse sentimento e o lugar de destaque que ele tem em nossa cultura nos últimos séculos. Porém, em todos os tempos aqueles que procuram um sentido maior para a vida humana não deixaram de observar que esse tipo de amor, tal como é usualmente compreendido, está longe de ser o mais nobre dentre os sentimentos. As razões disso não precisam ser explicadas ao leitor atento, mas uma em particular diz respeito à música de Simon & Garfunkel: a posse.

Não me refiro ao ciúme, aquela vigília contra a concorrência que a Mãe Natureza nos legou e que tantas vezes obscurece o espírito e a alegria de viver. Falo, simplesmente, da condicionalidade, o bom e velho "toma-lá-dá-cá" implicado na paixão, mas que se oculta no auge dessa emoção, quando o apaixonado se sente capaz de mover céus e terras pelo outro sem esperar nada em troca. Ora, esse altruísmo é sincero, sem dúvida, mas costuma ser ilusório, já que toda essa afeição intensa, flamejante, precisa de reciprocidade, do contrário mingua e morre (muitas vezes de forma dolorosa); se correspondida, dá e passa, de modo que, por si mesma, não se sustenta.
Então, se é assim, o que resta? O que lhe falta? E como reconhecer a diferença?

Esse é tema para mentes melhores e corações mais experientes que o deste blogueiro. Mas ficam as perguntas, minhas e de bilhões, sobre como podemos passar da condicionalidade à verdadeira generosidade que constitui o amor genuíno, mesmo em sua forma conjugal. E enquanto esse mistério não se resolve, vamos tateando pela vida, tentando descobrir na prática que amor é esse que tantos trabalhos nos damos para oferecer e pelo qual eventualmente nos deixamos iludir. E se um dia conseguirmos realmente desvendá-lo, aí, quem sabe, teremos condição de descobrir algo que vá além dele, um amor que, afinal, seja Amor.

Ponte sobre as águas turvas
(Adaptação de Evê Sobral)

Se a solidão for demais e em teu coração
não sentires a paz, eu quero estar bem perto
Como alguém que torce por teu bem

Como ponte sobre as águas turvas
Hás de me encontrar


Se a luz que tens se apagar e a escuridão,
meu Pai, ofuscar teu olhar
Verei a luz nas trevas do coração
Com a mão na tua mão

Como ponte sobre as águas turvas
Hás de me encontrar


Vamos navegar, navegar
Em busca de um lugar para a gente sonhar
Somos iguais, eu já sonhei também
Com esta mesma paz, e se acaso precisares de alguém
Hás de me encontrar

Como ponte sobre as águas turvas
Hás de me encontrar

"O" show


sábado, novembro 11, 2006

Milhões de japoneses não podem estar errados...

Japoneses enfrentam longas filas para comprar PlayStation 3
A Sony diz que 400 mil aparelhos serão disponibilizados nos EUA
Centenas de pessoas enfrentaram longas filas neste sábado no Japão para comprar o mais recente lançamento da Sony, o aparelho de videogame PlayStation 3.

Cem mil aparelhos foram colocados à venda e todos já teriam sido vendidos, embora a Sony não tenha confirmado a informação.

Devido à grande demanda pelo produto, as lojas de eletrônicos organizaram uma loteria para decidir quem na fila poderia comprar o tão esperado videogame.

Vendedores usaram microfones para acalmar clientes impacientes e alertar que a venda seria cancelada caso houvesse algum incidente.

"Eu estava esperando por esse dia há muito tempo. Vou jogar todo o fim de semana. Não vou nem comer", disse Tomoake Nakamura, de 41 anos, que estava na fila da loja Bic Camera, em Tóquio, onde estavam cerca de mil pessoas.

Preços

O novo aparelho da Sony está sendo vendido em duas configurações: uma versão mais cara com 60GB e wi-fi (60.000 ienes, o equivalente a R$ 1.090) e uma versão mais barata com 20GB (49.980 ienes, o equivalente a R$ 909).

O lançamento na Europa é aguardado para março do ano que vem e os preços devem ser mais caros do que no Japão.

Originalmente, o lançamento do PlayStation 3 estava marcado para o início de 2006, mas problemas na produção resultaram no atraso.

A Sony diz que 400 mil aparelhos serão disponibilizados nos Estados Unidos no dia 17 de novembro.

A expectativa da empresa é que 6 milhões estejam nas prateleiras ao redor do mundo até o final de março do ano que vem.

segunda-feira, outubro 30, 2006

O caminho da vida



"Suponhamos uma estrada longa, em cuja extensão se encontram, de distância em distância, mas com intervalos desiguais, florestas que se tem de atravessar e, à entrada de cada uma, a estrada, larga e magnífica, se interrompe, para só continuar à saída. O viajor segue por essa estrada e penetra na primeira floresta. Aí, porém, não dá com caminho aberto; depara-se-lhe, ao contrário, um dédalo inextricável em que ele se perde. A claridade do Sol há desaparecido sob a espessa ramagem das árvores. Ele vagueia, sem saber para onde se dirige. Afinal, depois de inauditas fadigas, chega aos confins da floresta, mas extenuado, dilacerado pelos espinhos, machucado pelos pedrouços. Lá, descobre de novo a estrada e prossegue a sua jornada, procurando curar-se das feridas.

Mais adiante, segunda floresta se lhe antolha, onde o esperam as mesmas dificuldades. Mas, ele já possui um pouco de experiência e dela sai menos contundido. Noutra, topa com um lenhador que lhe indica a direção que deve seguir para se não transviar. A cada nova travessia, aumenta a sua habilidade, de maneira que transpõe cada vez mais facilmente os obstáculos. Certo de que à saída encontrará de novo a boa estrada, firma-se nessa certeza; depois, já sabe orientar-se para achá-la com mais facilidade. A estrada finaliza no cume de uma montanha altíssima, donde ele descortina todo o caminho que percorreu desde o ponto de partida. Vê também as diferentes florestas que atravessou e se lembra das vicissitudes por que passou, mas essa lembrança não lhe é penosa, porque chegou ao termo da caminhada. É qual velho soldado que, na calma do lar doméstico, recorda as batalhas a que assistiu. Aquelas florestas que pontilhavam a estrada lhe são como que pontos negros sobre uma fita branca e ele diz a si mesmo: “Quando eu estava naquelas florestas, nas primeiras, sobretudo, como me pareciam longas de atravessar! Figurava-se-me que nunca chegaria ao fim; tudo ao meu derredor me parecia gigantesco e intransponível. E quando penso que, sem aquele bondoso lenhador que me pôs no bom caminho, talvez eu ainda lá estivesse! Agora, que contemplo essas mesmas florestas do ponto onde me acho, como se me apresentam pequeninas! Afigura-se-me que de um passo teria podido transpô-las; ainda mais, a minha vista as penetra e lhes distingo os menores detalhes; percebo até os passos em falso que dei.”

Allan Kardec, Obras Póstumas.



Otimismo


Se o naufrágio é inevitável, então afundemos graciosamente...

sábado, outubro 21, 2006

A fé que se nega

O ateísmo militante, um fenômeno que se tornou muito visível e aparentemente muito mais conhecido depois do advento da Internet, é uma corrente de pensamento das mais interessantes. Em primeiro lugar porque, com um pouco de cuidado, o internauta de todas as posições filosóficas tem nele um acervo considerável de textos e documentos úteis ao exame da religião, especialmente, como era de se esperar, sob um viés crítico. Em um dos mais ricos portais dedicados ao assuntos, o Internet Infidels, pode-se encontrar uma coleção de livros, ensaios e demais textos que examinam questões como a existência de Deus, a legitimidade da religião e do materialismo, as dificuldades da noção de vida após a morte, os fundamentos do método científico, a teodicéia e outros problemas filosóficos, além de temas ligados à ética e à moral. E o Infidels nem de longe é o único site dedicado a tais questões, embora certamente esteja entre os melhores. Conhecê-lo é, tanto para a pessoa religiosa quanto para a não-religiosa, uma exploração intelectual altamente estimulante, desde que se esteja preparado, no caso dos primeiros, para pôr as próprias crenças à prova.

Quando se faz esse exercício, é algo que ganha um novo significado: não precisa ser mais dogmática, ou fundada na desqualificação de quem a questiona. Pode-se simplesmente mantê-la reconhecendo que tem pontos mais ou menos aceitáveis, mais ou menos acessíveis ao exame puramente racional e, sim, que pode ter pontos que, de tão subjetivos, não são demonstráveis. Essa consciência, moldada nos embates mentais que a leitura de boa vontade dos ateus (ou céticos ou agnósticos) necessariamente propicia, inspira um setimento de humildade quanto às nossas convicções que é extremamente saudável. O auto-exame implícito nessas confrontações pode ser um excelente antídoto contra o fanatismo, o proselitismo exagerado e a adesão emocional inconseqüente a uma doutrina religiosa, infelizmente tão comum. Os "infiéis" forçam os religiosos a analisarem até onde seus princípios e crenças levam, coisa que muitas vezes não é feita nos púlpitos e seminários. Eles são muito hábeis em apontar incoerências, levantar questões obscuras, dados históricos e a minar a propaganda proselitista, que em várias ocasiões não sobrevive a um olhar mais crítico e informado.


Entretanto, esse esforço questionador dos ateus militantes e seus companheiros de cruzada anti-religiosa -- particularmente anti-cristãos --não os isenta dos mesmos males que se propõem combater. Suas fileiras também possuem os dogmáticos, os "senhores da verdade", os fanáticos e os proselitistas inconseqüentes. Também eles, tão céticos das crenças tradicionais de todos os quadrantes do globo, por vezes fecham os olhos às suas inconsistências e aos seus próprios maus hábitos de pensamento, fechando-se numa visão de mundo auto-congratulatória tão confortável e ingênua quanto a do religioso mais ardente. Isso porque, tanto num lado quanto do outro dessa disputa de convicções, somos todos humanos, e cada qual busca alento e diretrizes da forma como pode. Sejam evangélicos, muçulmanos, ateus, liberais ou marxistas, as energias psicológicas em questão não diferem muito: todos querem uma grade de referências com que entender o mundo e o seu papel nele. Uma vez que julguem tê-la encontrada, irão defendê-la com unhas e dentes, nem sempre da forma mais racional e justa.

Isso dito, é curioso como a história nos leva a certas inversões. Outrora a ciência era vista como uma forma, e não necessariamente a mais elevada, de dar a conhecer a obra de Deus e afirmar sua divina glória; hoje, ela é invocada não apenas para afirmar a absoluta impossibilidade de Deus e de uma dimensão espiritual do universo, como até mesmo para descartar a religiosidade como um artifício da natureza biológica do homem, útil até certo ponto mas já perfeitamente dispensável, quando não claramente prejudicial ao avanço da civlização. Tendo sido alçada à autoridade que um dia foi da religião, a ciência é, para alguns, o grande árbitro de todas as questões humanas, e, da mesma forma como antigamente se invocavam as fontes da fé na luta contra o demônio e seus representantes, o parecer do cientista se reveste de uma aura que poucos ousam desafiar. Aos olhos da maioria, ele é o cume da civilização, o sacerdote do verdadeiro saber, o arauto do único tipo de progresso legítimo. E alguns sabem muito bem do poder que possuem. Richard Dawkins, geneticista americano de renome, é um desses; um cruzado na guerra contra toda fé, sua obra é extensa e uma referência obrigatória para os que crêem ser a religião não apenas uma questão pessoal e inócua -- como asatuais regras de boas-maneiras sugerem que a tratemos --, mas uma enfermidade mental e cultural que deve ser extirpada do seio da humanidade tão logo seja possível.

Nesta resenha para a London Review of Books, Terry Eagleton, professor universitário e crítico literário, aborda o mais novo lance de Dawkins na sua luta para "sanear" a mente humana. O link para o site original se encontra no título do post.

--------------
Lunging, Flailing, Mispunching

Terry Eagleton

The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins · Bantam, 406 pp, £20.00

Imagine someone holding forth on biology whose only knowledge of the subject is the Book of British Birds, and you have a rough idea of what it feels like to read Richard Dawkins on theology. Card-carrying rationalists like Dawkins, who is the nearest thing to a professional atheist we have had since Bertrand Russell, are in one sense the least well-equipped to understand what they castigate, since they don’t believe there is anything there to be understood, or at least anything worth understanding. This is why they invariably come up with vulgar caricatures of religious faith that would make a first-year theology student wince. The more they detest religion, the more ill-informed their criticisms of it tend to be. If they were asked to pass judgment on phenomenology or the geopolitics of South Asia, they would no doubt bone up on the question as assiduously as they could. When it comes to theology, however, any shoddy old travesty will pass muster. These days, theology is the queen of the sciences in a rather less august sense of the word than in its medieval heyday.

Dawkins on God is rather like those right-wing Cambridge dons who filed eagerly into the Senate House some years ago to non-placet Jacques Derrida for an honorary degree. Very few of them, one suspects, had read more than a few pages of his work, and even that judgment might be excessively charitable. Yet they would doubtless have been horrified to receive an essay on Hume from a student who had not read his Treatise of Human Nature. There are always topics on which otherwise scrupulous minds will cave in with scarcely a struggle to the grossest prejudice. For a lot of academic psychologists, it is Jacques Lacan; for Oxbridge philosophers it is Heidegger; for former citizens of the Soviet bloc it is the writings of Marx; for militant rationalists it is religion.

What, one wonders, are Dawkins’s views on the epistemological differences between Aquinas and Duns Scotus? Has he read Eriugena on subjectivity, Rahner on grace or Moltmann on hope? Has he even heard of them? Or does he imagine like a bumptious young barrister that you can defeat the opposition while being complacently ignorant of its toughest case? Dawkins, it appears, has sometimes been told by theologians that he sets up straw men only to bowl them over, a charge he rebuts in this book; but if The God Delusion is anything to go by, they are absolutely right. As far as theology goes, Dawkins has an enormous amount in common with Ian Paisley and American TV evangelists. Both parties agree pretty much on what religion is; it’s just that Dawkins rejects it while Oral Roberts and his unctuous tribe grow fat on it.

A molehill of instances out of a mountain of them will have to suffice. Dawkins considers that all faith is blind faith, and that Christian and Muslim children are brought up to believe unquestioningly. Not even the dim-witted clerics who knocked me about at grammar school thought that. For mainstream Christianity, reason, argument and honest doubt have always played an integral role in belief. (Where, given that he invites us at one point to question everything, is Dawkins’s own critique of science, objectivity, liberalism, atheism and the like?) Reason, to be sure, doesn’t go all the way down for believers, but it doesn’t for most sensitive, civilised non-religious types either. Even Richard Dawkins lives more by faith than by reason. We hold many beliefs that have no unimpeachably rational justification, but are nonetheless reasonable to entertain. Only positivists think that ‘rational’ means ‘scientific’. Dawkins rejects the surely reasonable case that science and religion are not in competition on the grounds that this insulates religion from rational inquiry. But this is a mistake: to claim that science and religion pose different questions to the world is not to suggest that if the bones of Jesus were discovered in Palestine, the pope should get himself down to the dole queue as fast as possible. It is rather to claim that while faith, rather like love, must involve factual knowledge, it is not reducible to it. For my claim to love you to be coherent, I must be able to explain what it is about you that justifies it; but my bank manager might agree with my dewy-eyed description of you without being in love with you himself.

Dawkins holds that the existence or non-existence of God is a scientific hypothesis which is open to rational demonstration. Christianity teaches that to claim that there is a God must be reasonable, but that this is not at all the same thing as faith. Believing in God, whatever Dawkins might think, is not like concluding that aliens or the tooth fairy exist. God is not a celestial super-object or divine UFO, about whose existence we must remain agnostic until all the evidence is in. Theologians do not believe that he is either inside or outside the universe, as Dawkins thinks they do. His transcendence and invisibility are part of what he is, which is not the case with the Loch Ness monster. This is not to say that religious people believe in a black hole, because they also consider that God has revealed himself: not, as Dawkins thinks, in the guise of a cosmic manufacturer even smarter than Dawkins himself (the New Testament has next to nothing to say about God as Creator), but for Christians at least, in the form of a reviled and murdered political criminal. The Jews of the so-called Old Testament had faith in God, but this does not mean that after debating the matter at a number of international conferences they decided to endorse the scientific hypothesis that there existed a supreme architect of the universe – even though, as Genesis reveals, they were of this opinion. They had faith in God in the sense that I have faith in you. They may well have been mistaken in their view; but they were not mistaken because their scientific hypothesis was unsound.

Dawkins speaks scoffingly of a personal God, as though it were entirely obvious exactly what this might mean. He seems to imagine God, if not exactly with a white beard, then at least as some kind of chap, however supersized. He asks how this chap can speak to billions of people simultaneously, which is rather like wondering why, if Tony Blair is an octopus, he has only two arms. For Judeo-Christianity, God is not a person in the sense that Al Gore arguably is. Nor is he a principle, an entity, or ‘existent’: in one sense of that word it would be perfectly coherent for religious types to claim that God does not in fact exist. He is, rather, the condition of possibility of any entity whatsoever, including ourselves. He is the answer to why there is something rather than nothing. God and the universe do not add up to two, any more than my envy and my left foot constitute a pair of objects.

This, not some super-manufacturing, is what is traditionally meant by the claim that God is Creator. He is what sustains all things in being by his love; and this would still be the case even if the universe had no beginning. To say that he brought it into being ex nihilo is not a measure of how very clever he is, but to suggest that he did it out of love rather than need. The world was not the consequence of an inexorable chain of cause and effect. Like a Modernist work of art, there is no necessity about it at all, and God might well have come to regret his handiwork some aeons ago. The Creation is the original acte gratuit. God is an artist who did it for the sheer love or hell of it, not a scientist at work on a magnificently rational design that will impress his research grant body no end.

Because the universe is God’s, it shares in his life, which is the life of freedom. This is why it works all by itself, and why science and Richard Dawkins are therefore both possible. The same is true of human beings: God is not an obstacle to our autonomy and enjoyment but, as Aquinas argues, the power that allows us to be ourselves. Like the unconscious, he is closer to us than we are to ourselves. He is the source of our self-determination, not the erasure of it. To be dependent on him, as to be dependent on our friends, is a matter of freedom and fulfilment. Indeed, friendship is the word Aquinas uses to characterise the relation between God and humanity.

Dawkins, who is as obsessed with the mechanics of Creation as his Creationist opponents, understands nothing of these traditional doctrines. Nor does he understand that because God is transcendent of us (which is another way of saying that he did not have to bring us about), he is free of any neurotic need for us and wants simply to be allowed to love us. Dawkins’s God, by contrast, is Satanic. Satan (‘accuser’ in Hebrew) is the misrecognition of God as Big Daddy and punitive judge, and Dawkins’s God is precisely such a repulsive superego. This false consciousness is overthrown in the person of Jesus, who reveals the Father as friend and lover rather than judge. Dawkins’s Supreme Being is the God of those who seek to avert divine wrath by sacrificing animals, being choosy in their diet and being impeccably well behaved. They cannot accept the scandal that God loves them just as they are, in all their moral shabbiness. This is one reason St Paul remarks that the law is cursed. Dawkins sees Christianity in terms of a narrowly legalistic notion of atonement – of a brutally vindictive God sacrificing his own child in recompense for being offended – and describes the belief as vicious and obnoxious. It’s a safe bet that the Archbishop of Canterbury couldn’t agree more. It was the imperial Roman state, not God, that murdered Jesus.

Dawkins thinks it odd that Christians don’t look eagerly forward to death, given that they will thereby be ushered into paradise. He does not see that Christianity, like most religious faiths, values human life deeply, which is why the martyr differs from the suicide. The suicide abandons life because it has become worthless; the martyr surrenders his or her most precious possession for the ultimate well-being of others. This act of self-giving is generally known as sacrifice, a word that has unjustly accrued all sorts of politically incorrect implications. Jesus, Dawkins speculates, might have desired his own betrayal and death, a case the New Testament writers deliberately seek to rebuff by including the Gethsemane scene, in which Jesus is clearly panicking at the prospect of his impending execution. They also put words into his mouth when he is on the cross to make much the same point. Jesus did not die because he was mad or masochistic, but because the Roman state and its assorted local lackeys and running dogs took fright at his message of love, mercy and justice, as well as at his enormous popularity with the poor, and did away with him to forestall a mass uprising in a highly volatile political situation. Several of Jesus’ close comrades were probably Zealots, members of an anti-imperialist underground movement. Judas’ surname suggests that he may have been one of them, which makes his treachery rather more intelligible: perhaps he sold out his leader in bitter disenchantment, recognising that he was not, after all, the Messiah. Messiahs are not born in poverty; they do not spurn weapons of destruction; and they tend to ride into the national capital in bullet-proof limousines with police outriders, not on a donkey.

Jesus, who pace Dawkins did indeed ‘derive his ethics from the Scriptures’ (he was a devout Jew, not the founder of a fancy new set-up), was a joke of a Messiah. He was a carnivalesque parody of a leader who understood, so it would appear, that any regime not founded on solidarity with frailty and failure is bound to collapse under its own hubris. The symbol of that failure was his crucifixion. In this faith, he was true to the source of life he enigmatically called his Father, who in the guise of the Old Testament Yahweh tells the Hebrews that he hates their burnt offerings and that their incense stinks in his nostrils. They will know him for what he is, he reminds them, when they see the hungry being filled with good things and the rich being sent empty away. You are not allowed to make a fetish or graven image of this God, since the only image of him is human flesh and blood. Salvation for Christianity has to do with caring for the sick and welcoming the immigrant, protecting the poor from the violence of the rich. It is not a ‘religious’ affair at all, and demands no special clothing, ritual behaviour or fussiness about diet. (The Catholic prohibition on meat on Fridays is an unscriptural church regulation.)

Jesus hung out with whores and social outcasts, was remarkably casual about sex, disapproved of the family (the suburban Dawkins is a trifle queasy about this), urged us to be laid-back about property and possessions, warned his followers that they too would die violently, and insisted that the truth kills and divides as well as liberates. He also cursed self-righteous prigs and deeply alarmed the ruling class.

The Christian faith holds that those who are able to look on the crucifixion and live, to accept that the traumatic truth of human history is a tortured body, might just have a chance of new life – but only by virtue of an unimaginable transformation in our currently dire condition. This is known as the resurrection. Those who don’t see this dreadful image of a mutilated innocent as the truth of history are likely to be devotees of that bright-eyed superstition known as infinite human progress, for which Dawkins is a full-blooded apologist. Or they might be well-intentioned reformers or social democrats, which from a Christian standpoint simply isn’t radical enough.

The central doctrine of Christianity, then, is not that God is a bastard. It is, in the words of the late Dominican theologian Herbert McCabe, that if you don’t love you’re dead, and if you do, they’ll kill you. Here, then, is your pie in the sky and opium of the people. It was, of course, Marx who coined that last phrase; but Marx, who in the same passage describes religion as the ‘heart of a heartless world, the soul of soulless conditions’, was rather more judicious and dialectical in his judgment on it than the lunging, flailing, mispunching Dawkins.

Now it may well be that all this is no more plausible than the tooth fairy. Most reasoning people these days will see excellent grounds to reject it. But critics of the richest, most enduring form of popular culture in human history have a moral obligation to confront that case at its most persuasive, rather than grabbing themselves a victory on the cheap by savaging it as so much garbage and gobbledygook. The mainstream theology I have just outlined may well not be true; but anyone who holds it is in my view to be respected, whereas Dawkins considers that no religious belief, anytime or anywhere, is worthy of any respect whatsoever. This, one might note, is the opinion of a man deeply averse to dogmatism. Even moderate religious views, he insists, are to be ferociously contested, since they can always lead to fanaticism.

Some currents of the liberalism that Dawkins espouses have nowadays degenerated into a rather nasty brand of neo-liberalism, but in my view this is no reason not to champion liberalism. In some obscure way, Dawkins manages to imply that the Bishop of Oxford is responsible for Osama bin Laden. His polemic would come rather more convincingly from a man who was a little less arrogantly triumphalistic about science (there are a mere one or two gestures in the book to its fallibility), and who could refrain from writing sentences like ‘this objection [to a particular scientific view] can be answered by the suggestion . . . that there are many universes,’ as though a suggestion constituted a scientific rebuttal. On the horrors that science and technology have wreaked on humanity, he is predictably silent. Yet the Apocalypse is far more likely to be the product of them than the work of religion. Swap you the Inquisition for chemical warfare.

Such is Dawkins’s unruffled scientific impartiality that in a book of almost four hundred pages, he can scarcely bring himself to concede that a single human benefit has flowed from religious faith, a view which is as a priori improbable as it is empirically false. The countless millions who have devoted their lives selflessly to the service of others in the name of Christ or Buddha or Allah are wiped from human history – and this by a self-appointed crusader against bigotry. He is like a man who equates socialism with the Gulag. Like the puritan and sex, Dawkins sees God everywhere, even where he is self-evidently absent. He thinks, for example, that the ethno-political conflict in Northern Ireland would evaporate if religion did, which to someone like me, who lives there part of the time, betrays just how little he knows about it. He also thinks rather strangely that the terms Loyalist and Nationalist are ‘euphemisms’ for Protestant and Catholic, and clearly doesn’t know the difference between a Loyalist and a Unionist or a Nationalist and a Republican. He also holds, against a good deal of the available evidence, that Islamic terrorism is inspired by religion rather than politics.

These are not just the views of an enraged atheist. They are the opinions of a readily identifiable kind of English middle-class liberal rationalist. Reading Dawkins, who occasionally writes as though ‘Thou still unravish’d bride of quietness’ is a mighty funny way to describe a Grecian urn, one can be reasonably certain that he would not be Europe’s greatest enthusiast for Foucault, psychoanalysis, agitprop, Dadaism, anarchism or separatist feminism. All of these phenomena, one imagines, would be as distasteful to his brisk, bloodless rationality as the virgin birth. Yet one can of course be an atheist and a fervent fan of them all. His God-hating, then, is by no means simply the view of a scientist admirably cleansed of prejudice. It belongs to a specific cultural context. One would not expect to muster many votes for either anarchism or the virgin birth in North Oxford. (I should point out that I use the term North Oxford in an ideological rather than geographical sense. Dawkins may be relieved to know that I don’t actually know where he lives.)

There is a very English brand of common sense that believes mostly in what it can touch, weigh and taste, and The God Delusion springs from, among other places, that particular stable. At its most philistine and provincial, it makes Dick Cheney sound like Thomas Mann. The secular Ten Commandments that Dawkins commends to us, one of which advises us to enjoy our sex lives so long as they don’t damage others, are for the most part liberal platitudes. Dawkins quite rightly detests fundamentalists; but as far as I know his anti-religious diatribes have never been matched in his work by a critique of the global capitalism that generates the hatred, anxiety, insecurity and sense of humiliation that breed fundamentalism. Instead, as the obtuse media chatter has it, it’s all down to religion.

It thus comes as no surprise that Dawkins turns out to be an old-fashioned Hegelian when it comes to global politics, believing in a zeitgeist (his own term) involving ever increasing progress, with just the occasional ‘reversal’. ‘The whole wave,’ he rhapsodises in the finest Whiggish manner, ‘keeps moving.’ There are, he generously concedes, ‘local and temporary setbacks’ like the present US government – as though that regime were an electoral aberration, rather than the harbinger of a drastic transformation of the world order that we will probably have to live with for as long as we can foresee. Dawkins, by contrast, believes, in his Herbert Spencerish way, that ‘the progressive trend is unmistakable and it will continue.’ So there we are, then: we have it from the mouth of Mr Public Science himself that aside from a few local, temporary hiccups like ecological disasters, famine, ethnic wars and nuclear wastelands, History is perpetually on the up.

Apart from the occasional perfunctory gesture to ‘sophisticated’ religious believers, Dawkins tends to see religion and fundamentalist religion as one and the same. This is not only grotesquely false; it is also a device to outflank any more reflective kind of faith by implying that it belongs to the coterie and not to the mass. The huge numbers of believers who hold something like the theology I outlined above can thus be conveniently lumped with rednecks who murder abortionists and malign homosexuals. As far as such outrages go, however, The God Delusion does a very fine job indeed. The two most deadly texts on the planet, apart perhaps from Donald Rumsfeld’s emails, are the Bible and the Koran; and Dawkins, as one the best of liberals as well as one of the worst, has done a magnificent job over the years of speaking out against that particular strain of psychopathology known as fundamentalism, whether Texan or Taliban. He is right to repudiate the brand of mealy-mouthed liberalism which believes that one has to respect other people’s silly or obnoxious ideas just because they are other people’s. In its admirably angry way, The God Delusion argues that the status of atheists in the US is nowadays about the same as that of gays fifty years ago. The book is full of vivid vignettes of the sheer horrors of religion, fundamentalist or otherwise. Nearly 50 per cent of Americans believe that a glorious Second Coming is imminent, and some of them are doing their damnedest to bring it about. But Dawkins could have told us all this without being so appallingly bitchy about those of his scientific colleagues who disagree with him, and without being so theologically illiterate. He might also have avoided being the second most frequently mentioned individual in his book – if you count God as an individual.

Terry Eagleton is John Edward Taylor Professor of English Literature at Manchester University. His latest book is How to Read a Poem.

quinta-feira, outubro 19, 2006

Sentimental

Ponho-me a escrever teu nome
com letras de macarrão.
No prato, a sopa esfria, cheia de escamas
e debruçadas na mesa todos completam
esse romântico trabalho.

Desgraçadamente falta uma letra,
uma letra somente
para acabar teu nome!

- Está sonhando? Olhe que a sopa esfria!

Eu estava sonhando...
E há em todas as consciências um cartaz amarelo:
"Neste país é proibido sonhar."

Carlos Drummond de Andrade

quarta-feira, outubro 18, 2006

A violência e o Islã

Islam's heritage of violence

In an interview with Michael Mönninger, Abdelwahab Meddeb is perplexed by the Pope but makes clear that more shows of violence simply reinforce what he said.

http://www.signandsight.com/features/978.html

Die Zeit: Mr. Meddeb, how is it that in the Middle Ages, a peaceful dispute between Christians and Muslims was possible, whereas today, the very mention of these times causes an uproar?

Abdelwahab Meddeb: Because at that time, the Islamic world was home to a large, well-educated upper class which encouraged debate. Throughout the medieval period, there were renowned literary salons in major cities like Baghdad that were run by aristocratic patrons and merchants and whose sole raison d’être was to bring together Christians, Jews and various sects who did not agree at all on questions of faith. The Pope is wrong to speak of a single Islamic doctrine; there were many, and they were often the subject of open disputes. In Tunis, the capital of the Maghreb, the Sultan explicitly placed progressive theologians under the protection of the freedom of opinion and defended them against attacks by the people. Of course, the majority of simple Muslims were uneducated and hardly willing to be persuaded by the power of logic and arguments as the intellectuals hoped. Today, we have comparable Muslim masses, but there is little trace of an educated elite capable of leading the discussion.

Die Zeit: An obviously historical quotation used by the Pope is immediately understood as a declaration of aggression in the here and now. What is the source of this lack of historical awareness among Muslims?

Meddeb: I would ask you to consider that the Pope used this quotation not as a historical reference but as an assessment of Islam today. Nonetheless, Muslims must recognise that the aspects of their religion addressed by the Pope are not a malicious invention, but something that has existed from the outset in spoken and written form. For far too long now, Islam has failed to openly discuss this dangerous dimension of its faith. The imams and theologians are to blame for not dealing with the ignorance in their communities. The protesting masses show that the official state version of Islam has failed and that the old mediating role of the clerics is on the verge of bankruptcy. They are afraid that their mythology and the foundations of their faith will be demystified by historical and scientific criticism. So they put up barriers. Paradoxically, they are abetted in this by Western stereotypes, such as the claim that there is no dividing line between the religious and the political. In saying this, Western experts on Islam are in accord with the fundamentalists. A glance at the history of Islam shows that the claim is totally false.

Die Zeit: By raising the issue of violence, did the Pope hit a raw nerve?

Meddeb: Actually he didn’t, because theologians have been discussing this issue in great detail for centuries. In Islam, both sides exist: those who want conversion by the sword and want to kill all non-believers, and those who call for an end to coercion as part of religion. What is worrying is that in spite of this split, the violent side is the only one present in the media and in the self-image of Muslims. It’s just that when the Muslim subject falls ill, it chooses the warlike part of the Prophet’s message.

Die Zeit: Where does this disease come from?

Meddeb: If fanaticism was the disease of Catholicism and Nazism was the German disease, then fundamentalism is the disease of Islam. On the one hand, it is a way of fleeing the centuries-old inferiority to the West, but it is also a reaction to the failure of the West to acknowledge Islam as representing an inner otherness. But we should no longer react to these provocations by purely military means as in the failed war in Iraq. The real danger is not warlike Islam but authoritarian Islam which subjects day-to-day life in its entirety to religious practice.

Die Zeit: What was more provocative about the speech given by Pope Benedict XVI. – his criticism of the basis of the Islamic faith because it stands above all reason, or his raising of the question of violence?

Meddeb: The Pope is right to suggest that in principle, all belief systems built on ultimate truths will produce fanaticism. But what the Pope says about the role of reason in Islam is totally at odds with historical reality. One only has to study the theologians who convincingly founded Islam on reason following debates on Christianity and Hellenism. Seeing as he is German, it's a mystery to me why the Pope is not familiar with the rich intellectual resources devoted to these very issues by Islamic studies in Germany. That said, the protesting Muslims don’t have the slightest interest in subtleties like the question of reason. They take to the street because of the Pope’s mention of the issue of violence, and they don’t even realise that these violent manifestations confirm what the Pope is saying. Well into the nineteenth century and in many cases until the end of the colonial period, the great Islamic reformers repeatedly managed to neutralise jihad. But after World War I, the Islamists rediscovered jihad as a driving force to restore the hegemony and sovereignty of Islam.

Die Zeit: Are we going to see violent outbreaks like those triggered by the recent dispute over the Muhammed cartoons?

Meddeb: Only if the familiar feedback starts up again. In this matter, many Muslims resemble the Western media: they only show up when there’s trouble, because they love it when things escalate.

Die Zeit: What can the Pope do?


Meddeb: On no account should he tone down the dispute or allow himself to be intimidated. He has already apologised too much. I am very glad that he has addressed these problems. There is a growing number of Muslims who are willing to deal with such criticism in depth.

Die Zeit: Where does the violence in Islam come from?

Meddeb: It really is not unique to Islam. But whereas it took Christianity a thousand years to discover fire and the sword, this violent persuasion was part of Islam’s inheritance from the very beginning. Muhammed was a warlike Prophet, and the Islamic conquests from China to Spain followed a quasi-Napoleonic principle. Yes, Muhammed was a kind of successful Napoleon. But this is less astonishing than the fact that there was violence in Christianity, as this was completely at odds with the spirit of the gospels. Acting against all Christian teachings, there were Popes who also called for holy war and promised religious warriors a place in the kingdom of heaven. Not to mention the forced conversions during the Inquisition, when Jews and Muslims in Spain had the choice between exile, burning at the stake, and baptism. But just as the Christians overcame their historical phase of violence, the Muslims face the same challenge. What Europe experienced in the age of the Enlightenment happened a century later in the Arab world, coming mainly from Egypt, which until the interwar period was the centre of modernity and reason in the Islamic world. That was the place most likely to produce a figure like Spinoza, someone to finally break the taboo of the holiness of scripture.

Die Zeit: Why did this process stall?

Meddeb: Since the Middle Ages, Islam has been left behind by the rise of Christianity and has resigned itself to this plight. But we should not forget that Christianity too had to pass through the bloodbath of interdenominational wars. The fundamentalists’ current struggle against modernity can be seen as a form of belated inter-denominational war. One major problem is the failed Westernisation of many Muslims, who only have a scant knowledge of their own tradition and who are looking for a replacement. There is no more dramatic example than the attackers of September 11th, who may have been incapable of building aeroplanes but who were at least able to pilot them.

Die Zeit: What can the West do to ensure that this new religious war ends well?

Meddeb: What Europe must do – above all the Germans and the French – is to face Islam with solid convictions and to make clear to the Arab states what a danger the fundamentalists pose to the world. To give just one example: many countries have no idea of the unbelievable things going on in their schools. After September 11th, when Saudi Arabia’s leaders were reeling under the shock of Saudi nationals having attacked the country’s traditional protector, the USA, the Saudis were surprised to realise that their children’s schoolbooks contained things that were bound to produce hordes of little bin Ladens. The rulers of many Arab states have long since lost touch with their populations, which is most clearly visible in the puritanical Stone Age Islam of the Wahhabis.

Die Zeit: Which Islamic country holds the most promise in this respect?


Meddeb: Turkey. Its status as part of Europe is a matter of survival for us. Admitting the Turks into the EU would provide essential confirmation of the solidity of our principles, which are not just Judeo-Christian, but which contain a mighty historical promise of convergence. On this point, I do not agree at all with the Pope, who rejects the entry of Turkey into the EU. But I also think Morocco is on the right path, even if it has seen no republican awakening like Turkey. As a result of the French influence, the whole of the northern Mediterranean region is suited to becoming a laboratory for European thought. Only here can we win the worldwide cultural battle against the Islamists.

Die Zeit: But is Turkey modern enough?

Meddeb: I'm sure it is. The claims that a new Islamic republic is emerging in Turkey are all false. I only know one other country that defends its republican achievements with as much vigour as Turkey, and that is France. Democratic Islam is just as feasible as democratic Christianity. Moreover, the Turkish army protects secularism and makes sure that the Islamists abide by pluralism. What is happening in Turkey and Morocco is the strongest force in disarming the type of fundamentalism that is currently developing in Pakistan, the most dangerous development of its kind in the world. In Pakistan, fundamentalism lies at the heart of the reasons of state. By contrast, I am not at all concerned about Iran because Persian civilisation – in spite of Ahmadinejad – is enormously strong and highly developed. Iran's current attempt to secure a position within the world by means of its nuclear programme is a problem, but not an insoluble one, as the example of South Africa has shown.

Die Zeit: And what can the Pope do?

Meddeb: In his next address, he should delve a little deeper into the history of Islamic thought and not only refer Muslims to their shortcomings, but also remind them of the full glory of their traditions.

*

Abdelwahab Meddeb is a high-profile French writer of Arab origin. He was born in Tunis in 1946 and comes from a long family line of theologians and scholars. He studied art history and literature, beginning his working life as an editor for a major Paris publishing house. Between 1974 and 1988, he edited his own series of literary titles at Editions Sindbad. He has published the novels Talismano (1976) and Aya dans les villes (1999). His book The Malady of Islam (2003) gives a precise analysis of contemporary Islam. He lives in Paris.

This interview originally appeared in German in Die Zeit on September 21, 2006.